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ABSTRACT 
 
Policing Protests: An Exploratory Analysis of Crowd Management Policies 
 
by 
 
Logan P Kennedy 
 
Several policing strategies have been used to manage protest crowds over the past 50 
years. Research suggests that escalated force and command and control strategies were utilized 
until the 1990’s (Bourne, 2011; Schweingruber, 2000), while negotiated management has as 
emerged as a prominent protest management strategy within recent decades (Gillham, 2011; 
Gillham & Noakes, 2006).While literature describes the general evolution of protest strategies 
over time, there has been no systematic documentation of police approaches to crowd 
management.  
 This study examines police policies governing protest management to identify current 
U.S. police practices. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) provides model 
policies to help police agencies become familiar with best practices and develop their own 
policies. The IACP’s model policy on crowd management and control was used to identify 
tactics that represent best practice standards for protest management in the United States. 
Through a content analysis of policies from a sample of U.S. police agencies, this study assesses 
agency compliance with the IACP model policy on crowd management and control, as well as 
alignment with existing protest management strategies.  
Findings inform our understanding of current police protest management practices and 
offer policy implications. First, this study shows that there is a great deal of variation among 
protest management policies used within the sample agencies. Second, sample agency policies 
tend to adopt best practice escalated force tactics more often than command and control or 
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negotiated management practices. Finally, three specific themes related to community-oriented 
policing, strict enforcement and use of force, and regional differences emerge from bivariate and 
multivariate analyses. These themes offer direction for future theory development and protest 
management research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  
 In recent years, the media has portrayed police negatively, due to a number of 
controversial use of force incidents (Rickford, 2016). These instances have affected the publics’ 
opinion of officers on the street, arguably making it more difficult for police to accomplish day-
to-day tasks. Sir Robert Peel, the father of metropolitan policing, suggested in his nine principles 
of policing that public support is paramount for officers to succeed in their position (Emsley, 
2013). As such, the negative media portrayals of police affecting community perceptions of 
officers, may also affect police ability to successfully maintain order. 
 Legitimacy has emerged as a salient policing concern within recent years. Research 
suggests that, like Peel’s principles of policing, community support is essential for police to 
maintain order within the community (Tyler, 2003). Police legitimacy has been studied 
extensively, largely in relation to use of force and militarization. While police use of force is a 
complex moral dilemma that influences research frequently, there are instances when it is 
necessary to ensure officer and community safety. Ariel and Farrar (2015) contend that even 
when force is used appropriately, it can have damaging effects on community relations. 
Numerous agencies have recently revised use of force policies in response to public scrutiny 
(Albrecht, 2011). 
 Police use of force incidents have affected more than just public perceptions of police; 
social movements have begun protesting against police for perceived discriminatory tactics 
(Rickford, 2016). This presents a unique challenge for United States police agencies; managing 
the same protest crowds that are targeting police as a social issue. Police management of protests 
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aimed at police has been heavily scrutinized, particularly following media coverage of 
questionable policing tactics that have been employed during protests in the United States.   
 Recently, there have been several high-profile instances of controversial U.S. police 
protest responses. In 2011, Occupy Oakland turned violent and police were rebuked for 
indiscriminate use of impact projectiles (King, 2013). In 2014, the Ferguson unrest persisted for 
days, while police were criticized for militarized tactics and prohibiting First Amendment rights 
(Institute for Intergovernmental Research, 2015). Many of the criticisms for police responding to 
protests stem from what some perceive to be an unwarranted escalation toward increased use of 
force. However, there are instances when use of force may be appropriate to maintain order and 
safety. Recently, in Portland, an Antifa protest turned violent when protesters attacked Andy 
Ngo, a reporter for an online magazine, during the event. Protesters responsible for the attack 
were accused of throwing milkshakes mixed with quick-dry cement (Templeton, 2019). This is a 
situation where police use of force to restrain or arrest Ngo’s attackers would likely be seen by 
the public as an acceptable response.  
 Police protest management strategies have been a media and research focal point since 
the Civil Rights era. Mid-twentieth-century America saw the use of contentious police tactics, 
like indiscriminate applications of water cannons, tear gas, and impact rounds (McPhail, 
Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Schweingruber, 2000). These techniques often led to 
escalations of violence among the crowd, causing property destruction and injuries to police and 
crowd participants. Such disastrous consequences persuaded police to reconsider their approach 
toward protest crowds. Escalated force, or crowd dispersal, tactics were regularly adopted during 
the Civil Rights era (Bourne, 2011; McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; 
Schweingruber, 2000). However, research suggests that protest management strategies have 
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altered significantly since this timeframe (Bourne, 2011; Gillham, 2011; Gillham, Edwards, & 
Noakes, 2012; Gillham & Noakes, 2007; King, 2013).      
 Despite the transition in police tactics, the media and public citizens have continued 
scrutinizing police protest management strategies following controversial use of force incidents 
and tactics used to quell protest crowds. The increased publicity of these policing issues has 
promoted numerous changes to policy and practice, including the increased use of militarized 
tactics. Militarization has become increasingly controversial, with research suggesting that these 
practices are oppressive (Moule, Fox, & Parry, 2019). Sunshine and Tyler (2003) contend that 
militarization should be inversely related to police legitimacy, as these tactics are likely to lower 
favorable public attitudes toward officers. However, Moule and colleagues (2019) state that 
militarization is a function of legitimacy. If police are acting in a legitimate manner while using 
militarized tactics, public citizens will not perceive their actions to be overly authoritative. 
Despite this finding, increases in police militarization is highly contentious among the media and 
general public. As such, police have begun adopting alternative tactics that are directly 
associated with higher levels of perceived legitimacy. Most notably, police departments are 
reportedly engaging in more cooperative techniques when managing First Amendment 
gatherings. However, no systematic work has been conducted to determine the degree to which 
current police protest management policies align with best practice tactics or strategies described 
in the literature, nor have researchers assessed the level of variation across policies governing 
protest management for U.S. police agencies.  
Protest and crowd management policies can affect public perceptions of police. Crowd 
control strategies were heavily practiced in the 1960s and emphasized coercing crowd 
compliance (McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Schweingruber, 2000). Through these 
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tactics, police were instructed to use any means necessary to compel crowd obedience (McPhail, 
Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Schweingruber, 2000). Crowd control tactics have generated 
negative perceptions toward police agencies across the United States (Kenny et al., 2001). In 
response, police began adopting crowd management, rather than crowd control, approaches for 
special events. Crowd management refers to the ability to effectively organize and facilitate 
crowd movements (Abbott & Geddie, 2001), instead of simply responding to crowd violence 
using coercive measures.  
Successful crowd management requires an understanding of crowd-specific factors, such 
as their intentions and motivations for participation. Specific police tactics facilitate this 
understanding. For example, dialog with crowd organizers prior to and during a protest event is 
often used by police to understand protester motivation (Borch, 2013; King & Waddington, 
2006; Masterson, 2011). Research suggests that dialog is essential for crowd and officer safety 
(Abbott & Geddie, 2001; Gorringe & Rosie, 2009; Gorringe, Stott, &Rosie, 2012). This is 
reinforced by the development and adoption of dialog-based approaches in European countries. 
Police in other countries initially developed this model to promote order within crowds through 
legitimate means (Borch, 2013; Gorringe & Rosie, 2011; Holgersson & Knutsson, 2011). Due to 
the comparative success of this tactic, dialog-based crowd management approaches have recently 
emerged in the United States.  
Some newly developed crowd management strategies have originated from other 
approaches, like community policing, that emphasize public engagement and rely on residents to 
assist police. The distinction between crowd management and control is rarely discussed 
theoretically. In simplistic terms, crowd management is employed in the planning of events to 
facilitate the First Amendment rights of the crowd, while crowd control is utilized when those 
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rights should be suspended due to an escalation of violence. While crowd management is a 
highly praised approach that has gained traction within recent years, we still do not know the 
degree to which agency policies and, in turn, practices reflect crowd management tactics or 
traditional crowd control strategies. This study will examine the existing policies that govern 
police response and the strategies they explicitly promote to manage and control protest crowds 
in the United States.   
The development of protest management strategies is guided by police perceptions and 
understanding of crowds and crowd behaviors. One of the earliest theories of collective behavior 
contended that crowds were destructive and had no control over their own behavior. Research 
has significantly altered this perception throughout the years, with recent theorists arguing that 
crowd participants have individual motivations and act in accordance with their personal goals. 
Still, perceptions stemming from early and antiquated crowd theories continue to influence 
discussions and practices designed to manage crowd behaviors (Hoggett & Stott, 2010).  
 The purpose of the current study is to explore police policies governing crowd 
management to identify current protest management practices in the United States. This study 
assesses the degree to which current policies align with (1) tactics recommended by a national 
police organization–the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and (2) the basic tenets of 
three prominent protest management strategies (i.e., negotiated management, command and 
control, and escalated force). This dissertation also examines the relationship between agency- 
and jurisdiction-level characteristics and the content of police agency protest policies. The 
current study provides the first national-level empirical assessment of police protest management 
tactics used in the United States. 
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Overview of Study 
 As mentioned previously, U.S. police departments have significantly altered policy and 
practice associated with policing protests (Masterson, 2011). The historical shift in protest 
management strategies has been previously framed by theoretical perspectives concerning crowd 
behavior. Theories of collective behavior are rarely subjected to empirical assessment. However, 
some case studies have examined how crowds and police interact with one another and report 
outcomes of these interactions (Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2003; Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 1996; 
Stott & Reicher, 1998). These case studies provide at least partial support for existing crowd 
psychology and management theories. Police legitimacy (Tyler, 1990; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003), 
the RDFC Interaction Model (Eck & Madensen, 2017; Sousa & Madensen, 2016), and the 
Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) (Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2003; Reicher, 1984; 
Reicher, 1996; Stott & Reicher, 1998) are three of the most prominent theoretical frameworks 
used to explain when and why protesters are more likely to accept police intervention during 
protest events.  
 Chapter 2 begins with a brief overview of currently accepted theoretical frameworks used 
to explain police-protester interactions. Specifically, this section will expound upon how police 
legitimacy, the RDFC Interaction Model, and the ESIM explain crowd compliance and defiance. 
Following this is a summary of the literature pertaining to sociological and crowd-level factors 
found to impact protest violence. Specific attention is paid to protest participant motivations and 
how these motivations affect propensities for violence. Next, there is a historical overview of the 
evolution of police protest management strategies in the United States. Each of these strategies is 
reviewed in relation to the theoretical background that influenced their inception—specifically, 
Gustave Le Bon’s contagion theory, Wilson and Kelling’s broken windows theory, the RDFC 
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Interaction Model, and the ESIM. Additionally, emerging protest management strategies in the 
United States are discussed in relation to their efficacy in other countries. The use of dialog 
policing is highly praised in Europe, and the United States appears to be shifting toward this 
approach with current protest management strategies. Finally, there is a brief discussion of how 
existing police policies can be used to examine current police practices. Previous research has 
constructively analyzed agency policies to examine how agencies respond to vehicle pursuits, 
and it is suggested that those research methods can also be employed to examine protest 
management strategies.  
 Chapter 3 examines the methods used to conduct the current research. First, the study 
overview discusses policies to examine police behavior within various contexts. This is 
accomplished by examining police policies’ degree of compliance with the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) model policy on crowd management and control, as well 
as the alignment with existing theoretical protest management frameworks. Following this, the 
research questions for this study are explicitly stated and then discussed in terms of their 
relationship to previous literature and their contribution to future research. Third, the data are 
described in detail, including the specific variables that are examined for this study, as well as 
each data source. A brief explanation of the study’s sample and population of interest is also 
provided. Fourth, the independent and dependent variables are described and examined based on 
their relation to previous literature and theory. Finally, the analytical plan utilized for this study 
is illustrated, with brief descriptions of the univariate, bivariate, and multivariate statistical 
techniques employed.  
 Chapter 4 provides the analysis results, as well as brief explanations of the findings in 
light of the proposed research questions. The first question explores whether existing police 
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policies comply with best practices proposed by the IACP model policy. Findings emphasize the 
most and least frequently adopted tactics recommended by the IACP, as well as the degree to 
which current U.S. police crowd management policies follow best practice recommendations. 
The second question investigates how current agency policies align with three predominate 
protest management strategies. Findings highlight the most commonly adopted techniques within 
each strategy, as well as emphasizing characteristics of those agencies that are most and least 
closely aligned with each management strategy. Third, and finally, bivariate correlations and 
linear regression models are presented, thus identifying significant associations between agency- 
and jurisdiction-level variables and tactics proposed by the IACP model policy, as well as the 
three major protest management strategies.  
 Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation with a discussion of the study’s contribution to 
current literature. Specifically, a discussion is provided to describe the findings in light of three 
notable outcomes concerning the impact of community-oriented policing, jurisdiction-level 
characteristics, and regional variation in policy content. Next, the general strengths and 
weaknesses along with the implications of this research are explored. This research offers 
practical recommendations for police policy and practice, as well as a potential roadmap for 
future research. Finally, this dissertation concludes with a brief discussion of how this study 
contributes to and expands upon previous literature and accepted knowledge of police practices. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Early crowd theorists contended that crowds were irrational, destructive forces of nature 
(Le Bon, 1895; Sighele, 1891; Tarde, 1898). Promoting this perspective was Gustave Le Bon, 
the theorist credited with establishing crowd psychology as a field. The Le Bonian perspective 
contends that crowd participants experience irrationality and a sense of de-individuation, or 
contagion (Le Bon, 1895). Le Bon’s contagion theory emphasizes a loss of individualism within 
the crowd, while contending that participants are only capable of negative emotions. This theory 
is the basis for the term “mob mentality” in social psychology. While later research provides 
alternative explanations for crowd violence, some studies suggest that the Le Bonian perspective 
still drives police protest management practices (Hoggett & Stott, 2010).  
 The act of protesting has been defined as an expression of views, to the public or 
government, on social and political issues (Bourne, 2011). John Lofland (1985) defines protest as 
acting on extreme feelings and dissension against a single entity in a public forum. Bourne’s and 
Lofland’s definitions hold that protesting occurs through an expression of values that targets an 
individual or institution. Additionally, the expressions within this process are typically the result 
of relative deprivation, or perceived injustices against a group (Isaac, Mutran, & Stryker, 1980; 
Runciman, 1966; Stoeffer, Suchman, Devinney, Star, & Williams, 1949). W. G. Runciman 
(1966) contends that relative deprivation occurs when a group’s rights do not align with those 
afforded to other populations. For example, during the Civil Rights era, African-Americans were 
deprived of basic human rights that other populations in the United States were guaranteed. 
Some of the most prominent protests stemming from perceptions of relative deprivation in recent 
years have involved issues of racial inequality. 
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 Recently, Black Lives Matter has engaged in a number of protests focusing on perceived 
discriminatory tactics by police against minorities (Rickford, 2016; www.blacklivesmatter.com, 
2013). One highly publicized event was the 2014 shooting of Michael Brown by a Ferguson, 
Missouri, police officer, which called into question tactics that were used against members of the 
minority community. This shooting sparked protests nationwide, with the objective of 
discontinuing excessive use of force by police (Rickford, 2016). When the officer responsible for 
the shooting was acquitted of criminal charges, some Ferguson residents engaged in riotous 
behavior that resulted in numerous injuries and millions of dollars in property damage (Chasmar, 
2014). The Ferguson unrest became one of the most notorious and violent events in modern 
history. 
 In 2017, the protest in Charlottesville, South Carolina, brought attention to white 
nationalist movements. This event was catalyzed by the planned removal of a controversial 
statue of Confederate General Robert E. Lee from Charlottesville’s Emancipation Park. White 
nationalists argued that it was a Confederate monument signifying a period of history crucial to 
their party’s formation. Counterdemonstrators argued that the statue was disrespectful to 
minority populations, as it symbolized slavery during the Civil War. They contested that the 
beliefs of the Confederate party were founded on hate and, therefore, should not be memorialized 
within the park. During the event, white nationalists marched through the local university 
campus with torches, chanting Nazi-related slogans (Keneally, 2018). The tension between the 
two parties culminated when one of the attendees accelerated his car through a crowd of 
counterdemonstrators, injuring dozens and killing one protester.  
 Also in 2017, a May Day demonstration in Portland, Oregon turned violent. May Day is 
an international day emphasizing labor rights, that occurs on May 1st annually (Nowak, N.D.). 
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The event in Portland began peacefully with speakers urging participants to support immigrants’ 
rights in the workforce. As demonstrators marched toward the waterfront, participants began 
throwing rocks, cans, and Molotov cocktails (Ryan, 2017). Police responded to this violence by 
engaging in crowd dispersal tactics. The violent behavior during this event led to 25 arrests and 
the vandalization of multiple establishments.  
 In Ferguson, Portland, and Charlottesville, the common theme among participants was 
the feeling of inequality. Whether inequality is felt from current practices or previous 
transgressions, it has been a major reason for public demonstrations over the last half-century. 
While some theories have argued that relative deprivation is the basis for protesting (Stoeffer et 
al., 1949), others have expanded upon this idea by arguing that it more specifically explains 
protest violence (Isaac et al., 1980).  
 Preventing violence is the primary goal of police when they act as crowd managers 
(Borch, 2013; Madensen & Knutsson, 2011). In the United States, freedom of speech is one of 
the fundamental rights afforded to citizens. As crowd managers, police face unique challenges in 
protest scenarios, due to the necessity of balancing individual rights with societal safety. This 
dissertation examines how police approach crowd management and how, according to previous 
literature, police tactics influence protest crowd behaviors.  
Compliance or Defiance: A Theoretical Explanation of Defiance Within the Crowd 
 Tom R. Tyler (1990) introduced the idea of procedural justice in his seminal book, Why 
People Obey the Law. Prior to this publication, research was specifically interested in 
discretionary police behaviors. Many studies examined the types of outcomes that were 
associated with police discretion (i.e., arrests) (Pilavian & Briar, 1964). Over time, research 
became less interested in the outcomes of police decisions and more focused on the process 
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associated with their decision-making. Police legitimacy translated the idea of procedural justice 
from the courts to police, emphasizing the importance of positive police-citizen interactions. 
According to this theory, citizens are especially concerned with how they are treated by 
authorities and the transparency of decision-making processes (Blader & Tyler, 2003). Studies 
have demonstrated that, when people are treated fairly and the decision-making process is 
transparent, the outcome of the decision is not as detrimental to citizen perceptions of police 
(Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Essentially, when police use fair and just discretionary practices and 
explain how they came to their decision, they are more likely to be perceived favorably 
(Mazerrole, Bennett, Davis, Sargeant, & Manning, 2013). When the public perceives the police 
in a legitimate manner, they are more likely to comply with police directives (Blader & Tyler, 
2003). Findings from previous research reinforce the argument that when police are perceived as 
unjust, the public will feel alienated, thus leading to defiance (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003).  
 Defiance can be defined as the resistance of police directives or interventions (Sherman, 
1993). Crowd research has previously examined defiance toward police, and many explanations 
emphasize their use of authority as a central reason for crowd noncompliance (Madensen & 
Knutsson, 2011; Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 1996). According to the theories of procedural justice 
and police legitimacy, when police over-exert or inconsistently employ their authority, the crowd 
may view this as justification for defiance (Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2003; Madensen & 
Knutsson, 2011; Reicher, 1996; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). The use of illegitimate tactics emits 
feelings of alienation within the crowd, thus increasing the likelihood of noncompliance (Drury, 
Reicher, & Stott, 2003; Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 1996; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Crowd defiance 
can lead to disastrous, even violent, consequences. These theories and related research suggest 
that police practices play a pivotal role in the outcome of protest violence.  
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 While procedural justice and police legitimacy are two of the most common explanations 
for defiance, other theories expand on the legitimacy of police behaviors and the impact defiance 
has on violent outcomes. Two such theories are the RDFC Interaction Model (Eck & Madensen, 
2017; Madensen, Heskett, & Lieberman, 2012; Sousa & Madensen, 2016) and the Elaborated 
Social Identity Model, also known as the ESIM (Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2003; Reicher, 1984; 
Reicher, 1996; Stott & Reicher, 1998).    
 The RDFC Interaction Model emphasizes the types of behaviors that police should 
exhibit to increase levels of legitimacy. Madensen and colleagues (2012) argue that when police 
demonstrate reasonable, disarming, focused, and consistent behaviors, the public will voluntarily 
comply with police directives (Eck & Madensen, 2017; Madensen Heskett, & Lieberman, 2012; 
Sousa & Madensen, 2016). The first dimension, reasonable, refers to the extent to which police 
adhere to discretionary decisions or legalistic approaches when they manage others’ behaviors 
(Eck & Madensen, 2017; Sousa & Madensen, 2016). According to Sousa and Madensen (2016), 
the public is more likely to comply with police directives that protect citizen rights and are 
necessary to prevent harm. Many police agencies tasked with crowd management accentuate the 
importance of protecting citizen rights (Masterson, 2011). When police policies do not follow 
these guidelines, crowds may be more likely to defy their authority.  
 When police are disarming, they de-escalate volatile situations without physical force 
(Clouse, 2018; Eck & Madensen, 2017; Sousa & Madensen, 2016). This is especially relevant in 
today’s climate as many agencies are engaging their officers in verbal de-escalation training 
(Oliva, Morgan, & Compton, 2010). While dialog is important for police to de-escalate 
situations, image can also influence volatile interactions. Sousa and Madensen (2016) contend 
that officers in soft uniforms are perceived as less threatening than those in full riot gear. When 
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police adopt militarized tactics, the likelihood of violence increases (Myers-Montgomery, 2016). 
Disarming (i.e., non-hostile and non-threatening) tactics are hypothesized to increase the 
likelihood that crowds will comply with police directives (Sousa & Madensen, 2016). 
 The focus dimension refers to using force only against problematic individuals in a crowd 
instead of targeting whole groups. This dimension draws largely from the ESIM, which argues 
that groups in a crowd have differing motivations. According to the Le Bonian perspective, 
crowd members lose all sense of individuality upon participation in the group (Le Bon, 1895). 
The ESIM refutes this argument, stating that crowd members still hold their individual beliefs 
and values during crowd participation (Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2003; Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 
1996). Rather than operate under the crowd’s single mindset, participants tend to form groups 
based on their objectives, and these smaller assemblies make up the larger crowd (Drury & 
Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998; Reicher & Stott, 2011). As 
such, identity is dynamic and shifts temporarily toward group-based attributes. Upon 
participation in the crowd, the individual adopts the predominant identity that aligns with the 
objectives of their specified group, not the crowd as a whole.  
 The ESIM expands upon the Le Bonian perspective by explaining crowd behavior from 
an intergroup lens (i.e., how crowd participants interact with one another) rather than from the 
traditional intragroup perspectives (i.e., how crowds interact with other entities). This 
perspective is typically used to explain how the interaction between groups within the crowd can 
result in defiance against police and overall crowd violence.  When, for instance, peaceful 
protesters and violent anarchists are present within the same crowd, police should focus their 
intervention efforts on the problematic anarchists while protecting the rights of peaceful 
protesters to avoid larger crowd violence. By targeting the violent anarchists, police are focusing 
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only on those engaged in harmful behavior and are more likely to be perceived as legitimate 
authority figures (Eck & Madensen, 2016; Sousa & Madensen, 2016).  
 Finally, consistency relates to the actions of police across similar contexts and time (Eck 
& Madensen, 2017; Sousa & Madensen, 2016). This dimension argues that police reactions to 
protesters should be congruent across similar situations over time. Consistent behavior is 
predictable, and since the crowd knows what type of police actions to expect, they will not be 
provoked by unexpected police intervention (Eck & Madensen, 2017). Consistency ties the rest 
of the dimensions together. If police behavior is erratic, public confidence will most likely be 
reduced, especially if the directive seems to be motivated by bias (Clouse, 2018; Sousa & 
Madensen, 2016). When police behavior aligns with the RDFC Interaction Model, officers are 
more likely to be perceived favorably, which also diminishes the possibility of defiance within 
the crowd. Increasing compliance within the crowd is essential to reducing violence during 
protests.  
Protest Violence 
 The right to gather peacefully and express personal and societal views is the cornerstone 
of a democratic society. However, once these events become violent, that constitutional right 
becomes limited. In the United States, collective behavior is often stigmatized and directly, if 
unfairly, associated with violence. As such, regardless of motivations, police responsible for 
crowd management often view demonstrators as a single entity (Hoggett & Stott, 2010). 
Contrary to popular belief, only about ten percent (10%) of protests result in violence 
(Davenport, Soule, & Armstrong, 2011).  
Protest crowds typically differ in their motivations and behaviors from other groups 
(Isaac et al., 1980; Nilson & Nilson, 1980). Aligning with the Le Bonian (1895) perspective, 
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modern researchers contend that negative emotions are often the motivation for protest 
participation. Negative emotions—anger, frustration, alienation, anomie—are often the result of 
perceived injustices against an individual or a group (Isaac et al., 1980; Jasper, 1998; Smelser, 
1963; Stoeffer et al, 1949; Runciman, 1966). That complex of feelings may predictably result in 
violence. 
Previous research has examined numerous protest factors associated with violence, but 
none of those studies included recent events. While much of the protest research is outdated and 
may not accurately reflect the nature of protests today, a general level of consensus among the 
earlier findings identified factors commonly associated with violent protest outcomes. The 
factors discussed in the following section are outlined within two general categories: crowd-level 
factors and sociological factors. Crowd-level factors are group-level elements that represent the 
physical nature of the crowd (e.g., demonstrator race and number of protesters). Sociological 
factors can be defined as social factors that arise from the community or society (e.g., protester 
motivation, target of protest, and police presence).    
Crowd-level factors. While a number of crowd-level variables may be attributed to 
violence, two specific crowd-level factors are routinely associated with protest violence: 
demonstrator race and protest size (Davenport et al., 2011; Eisinger, 1973; Isaac et al., 1980).  
 Black Lives Matter emerged in 2013 with the objective of eliminating perceived 
discriminatory police practices in the United States (Rickford, 2016; www.blacklivesmatter.com, 
2013). This prominent social movement has often been compared with the Civil Rights 
movement, due to the similarity of their motivation for protesting (Rickford, 2016). During both 
time periods, African-Americans perceived relative deprivation. While empirical studies have 
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been conducted on protest violence during the Civil Rights era, protests surrounding the Black 
Lives Matter movement have only been discussed theoretically.  
 Previous research suggests that protests with more Black participants experience higher 
rates of violence (Davenport et al., 2011; Eisinger, 1973; Isaac et al., 1980). Relative deprivation 
theory attributes this to limited opportunity for the black community to affect social change 
(Isaac et al., 1980). For instance, during Black Lives Matter protests, Black community members 
have felt disproportionately targeted by excessive use of force (www.blacklivesmatter.com, 
2013). When peaceful protest does not accomplish its intended goal, those perceiving relative 
deprivation feel that violence is the only viable alternative (Isaac et al., 1980).  
 Black citizens’ feelings of deprivation have been documented since the Civil Rights era 
and through the Black Lives Matter movement (Eisinger, 1973; Isaac et al., 1980; Rickford, 
2016). Civil Rights–era blacks fought to obtain basic human rights that were guaranteed to other 
populations in the United States. Restrictions placed on these black populations included 
segregation in schools and perceived discriminatory practices by businesses. Although these 
prejudiced practices have diminished over time, many studies argue that such racial disparities 
are still present today (Rickford, 2016). Case in point: Black Lives Matter contends that African-
Americans are deprived of the right to safe interactions with police. Research concurs that 
minorities are targeted disproportionately by police use of lethal force (Engel & Calnon, 2004; 
Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002).  
 While demonstrator race has been largely associated with violence, protest size is also a 
factor: larger protests tend to be more violent than smaller ones (Davenport et al., 2011; Eisinger, 
1973). As more demonstrators engage, police become less familiar with participants and their 
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motivations and, in turn, are more likely to rely on aggression to force compliance than on 
coordination with protesters (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; Noakes & Gillham, 2007).   
Boston Police Chief William Evans stated, “If we go in expecting a fight, that’s what 
we’ll get” (Peak & Sousa, 2018). This quote accentuates the importance of cooperation between 
police and protest organizers. As discussed in the following section, familiarity between police 
and organizers breeds trust and cooperation. Building lasting relationships between police and 
protesters promotes positive experiences for all parties involved (King, 2013; Gillham & Noakes, 
2007). Recently, these cooperative approaches have become more prevalent for crowd 
management. Coordination with crowd members assists police in their efforts to discern the 
shifting identities within the group.  
Crowd-level factors are crucial in understanding group behaviors. However, without 
knowledge of external influences, research is limited in explaining why groups behave in a 
specific manner. The interaction between crowd-level and sociological factors is essential to 
identifying the situational contexts of protest violence.  
Sociological factors. Sociological factors are societal-level variables that provide 
environmental context for the occurrence of protest violence. They explain how societal disputes 
can motivate people to engage in protest and why they have targeted specific entities. Previous 
research highlights three such factors: protest motivation, protest target, and police presence 
(Davenport et al., 2011; Eisinger, 1973).  
 Protest motivation and target are inherently associated with one another. Motivation is 
defined as the reason that demonstrations occur (Eisinger, 1973). A common motivation within 
recent years is the perceived use of excessive force by police against minorities (Rickford, 2016). 
The target of the protest is the entity toward which the event is being directed (Eisinger, 1973).  
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Indeed, police have been the target of recent protests due to perceived increases in lethal force 
against members of the Black community (Rickford, 2016).  
 This example emphasizes systemic issues that affect specific populations at a 
disproportionate rate. Black Lives Matter contends that systemic racism inherently occurs within 
the United States criminal justice system (www.blacklivesmatter.com, 2013). Systemic racism 
arguably accounts for the media’s highlighting of overtly aggressive tactics by Black Lives 
Matter and the resultant public perception that black protesters have a greater predisposition to 
violence than protesters in other social movements (Isaac et al., 1980; Rickford, 2016). To the 
contrary, research suggests that many protesters associated with Black Lives Matter do not incite 
or condone violence during their events (Hoffman, Granger, Vallejos, & Moats, 2016; Rickford, 
2016).  
 Police responsible for managing crowds during Black Lives Matter events face unique 
challenges. They experience the unique dynamic of being crowd managers at the same 
demonstrations that are targeting them for perceived discriminatory tactics. When police are both 
crowd manager and protest target, it is difficult to rely on cooperative techniques because of the 
demonstrators’ lack of trust. Still, while some sociological factors predict violence, police have a 
decisive impact on the demonstration’s outcome. Their use of overtly authoritarian tactics 
increases the possibility of crowd rebellions against them (Madensen & Knutsson, 2011; 
Reicher, 1984; Drury & Reicher, 2000).  
 Police presence has been routinely correlated with protest violence: when police are 
present, the likelihood of violence increases substantially (Davenport et al., 2011; Eisinger, 
1973).  While police play an instrumental role in the protest outcome, no studies have examined 
the mediating effect that police management strategies may have on violence. Previous studies 
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have examined only whether police were present at the event, and most do not distinguish 
whether police were crowd managers for the event or were responding to calls for service due to 
a threat of violence. Additionally, there have been no large-scale empirical studies of police 
protest management strategies; that discussion is purely theoretical and typically supported by 
individual case studies. Tactics representative of each of the strategies have not been examined 
to ensure they align with existing research or theoretical models–an understanding that is 
essential to educating police on appropriate responses to protests. Currently, United States police 
agencies continue to be educated on the Le Bonian perspective (Hoggett & Stott, 2010), which 
highlights crowds as destructive forces of nature (Le Bon, 1895). However, recent research has 
emphasized that this theory is limited in its explanation of collective behavior, as it does not 
explain lawful and peaceful assemblies. 
Police Response to Protests: Historical Progression of Crowd Management 
Protest policing research dates back to the Civil Rights era (Bourne, 2011; Davenport et 
al., 2011; Eisinger, 1973). One of the most frequent themes across this research is the adversarial 
relationship between police and demonstrators. The perceived use of indiscriminate force by 
police during demonstrations has been sensationalized in the media, leading to lower levels of 
perceived legitimacy by society (King, 2013; Rickford, 2016). Media coverage of these events 
has increased the scrutiny of police behavior, with many arguing that they are employing 
“illegitimate” tactics during protests (King, 2013).  
 Police have employed four prominent protest management strategies over the last sixty 
years. Some of these strategies emphasize formal social control and tactics that may be perceived 
as less appropriate. However, in recent years, there has been shifts in proposed best practices of 
protest management strategies. Contemporary studies suggest that dialog and cooperation are 
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important in preventing protest violence (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; Gorringe, Stott, & Rosie, 
2012; King, 2013). Each of these four strategies—escalated force, command and control, 
negotiated management, and strategic incapacitation—will be discussed in detail, including their 
central tenets and the theoretical perspectives that influenced them. 
Escalated force. The earliest, and arguably most scrutinized, form of protest 
management is escalated force, a reactive type of policing often associated with shows and use of 
force to coerce compliance (Hoggett & Stott, 2010). Many agencies utilize this strategy when a 
protest escalates toward violence or becomes a civil disturbance (IACP, 2014). Heavily used 
during the Civil Rights era, this approach is based on the assumption that crowds are irrational 
and destructive (Della Porta & Reiter, 2016; Le Bon, 1895; Schweingruber, 2000) and that 
aggression by demonstrators justifies equal or greater force by police to disperse the crowd 
(Schweingruber, 2000).  
There are five dimensions of police behavior that define escalated force (McPhail, 
Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998). First, police ignore First Amendment rights in the face of 
escalating violence and disorder (Schweingruber, 2000) because violence necessitates immediate 
dispersal. Second, police are responsible for dispersing crowds to prevent community disruption. 
Because crowds are perceived as disruptive to routine activities, police are tasked with their 
dispersal, so there is no tolerance for their formation. Third, due to this intolerance of collective 
behavior, police have no prior communication with protest leaders. Some research suggests that 
escalated force strategies are linked to violence due to police aversion to cooperation and 
communication (King, 2013; Kingshott, 2014). Fourth, mass arrest is used against those 
engaging in civil disobedience so that the crowd will disperse, deterring further disorderly 
behavior. When this proves ineffective, police employ indiscriminate force on the crowd—the 
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fifth element of escalated force (McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Schweingruber, 
2000).  
The use of force to disperse crowds is a defining trait of escalated force strategies 
(Schweingruber, 2000). Use of force is employed during civil disturbances to enforce police 
directives. When force is employed indiscriminately, the crowd may perceive it to be an 
illegitimate use of force and resist police directives (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1996; Stott 
& Reicher, 1998). Force is employed indiscriminately when police target the entire crowd, rather 
than focusing on those unruly participants (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1996; Stott, Drury, 
& Reicher, 2016; Stott & Reicher, 1998). The use of indiscriminate force has been controversial, 
and is often perceived as an illegitimate policing tactic, due to the increased possibility of 
injuring nonviolent bystanders. Alternatively, previous literature contends that police behaviors 
perceived as legitimate increase public willingness to comply with police directives (Eck & 
Madensen, 2017; Sousa & Madensen, 2012)  
The Le Bonian perspective of crowds as irrational and disruptive provides the framework 
for escalated force strategies (Hoggett & Stott, 2010; Le Bon, 1895). Contagion theory argues 
that the crowd operates under a single mindset (Le Bon, 1895). This perception of crowds 
justifies the use of indiscriminate force, as this may be necessary when the entire crowd is non-
compliant and engaging in violence (Hoggett & Stott, 2010). The threat of large-scale violence 
or serious property damage requires the police to ensure societal safety, so their primary goal is 
to disperse the crowd by any means necessary (IACP, 2014; Schweingruber, 2000). Because 
such force often leads the public to perceive police in an illegitimate manner (Hoggett & Stott, 
2010; Murray, 2010), police have altered their approach to lawful assemblies (Bourne, 2011).  
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Command and control. Command and control emerged as the prominent paradigm of 
protest crowd management during the 1980s, when there was a heavy emphasis on the impact of 
community disruption (Vitale, 2005). While this strategy promotes a slightly more accepting 
view of collective action and more emphasis on First Amendment rights than escalated force 
strategies does, the act of protest is still seen as a form of community disruption (Bourne, 2011) 
because crowds interfere with routine activities.  
 Previous research contends that command and control was derived from the use of strict 
enforcement tactics (Lough et al., 2010; Vitale, 2005). This approach entails adopting a strict, 
legalistic approach for enforcing minor offenses (Harcourt, 1998; 2001). These types of tactics 
have often been equated with the use of zero-tolerance policing, which is controversial due to its 
perceived discrimination toward minority communities (Harcourt, 2001). The adoption of this 
approach correlates with command and control due to the low tolerance for community 
disruption. Command and control strategies involve the restriction of time, place, and manner of 
protest (Bourne, 2011; Vitale, 2005) to minimize the potential for community disruption. 
Additionally, those protesters engaging in disruptive tactics would likely be subjected to 
immediate removal from the crowd, as this aligns with strict enforcement tactics (Harcourt, 
1998; 2001). Police agencies aligning with this model may facilitate First Amendment 
assemblies until crowd members violate the restrictions placed on them by police. While 
restrictions are an essential component of command and control strategies, there are other crowd 
management tactics that align with this model.  
 Vitale (2005) introduced five necessary elements for a strategy to be classified as 
command and control. First, there must be aversion to community disruption. Police must do 
everything in their power to prevent demonstrations from interfering with routine community 
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activities. This is generally accomplished by placing restrictions on the event and its attendees, 
through tactics like spatial containment (e.g., barricades). Second, access to the event itself is 
controlled. Police employ barricades to separate the crowd from the public and limit the entry 
points into the crowd. Wilson and Kelling (1982) discuss two types of disorder: social and 
physical. Protest crowds are perceived as social disorder when they disrupt the activities of the 
general public. Therefore, dispersing crowds to ensure that bystanders do not participate is a 
pivotal component of this strategy. Third, the police should divide-and-conquer protest 
participants. Using additional barricades within the crowd to separate protest groups diminishes 
the effect the groups have on each other and reduces contamination among bystanders. Fourth, 
there should be a shock-and-awe component to the protest management strategy. Agencies 
should deploy as many officers as the resources allow to deter unlawful or unpermitted behavior. 
The sheer mass of officers present is meant to act as a deterrent to the crowd as a whole. The 
fifth, and final, element of command-and-control strategies is zero-tolerance policing. As noted 
previously, strict enforcement strategies are often equated with this style of policing (Harcourt, 
1998; 2001), thus creating an impact on the development of command and control strategies 
(Vitale, 2005). Over time, however, the restrictions placed on protest crowds became more 
controversial, leading to the development of cooperative techniques. 
Negotiated management. Negotiated management emerged as a protest management 
strategy during the 1990s. Negotiated management emphasizes the use of dialog between police 
and demonstrators throughout the planning and demonstration process (Gillham, 2011; King, 
2013). Literature highlights negotiated management as a desirable protest management strategy 
for police agencies in the United States. Recently, and historically, relationships between police 
and specific communities have been tumultuous. As such, researchers have promoted the use of a 
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cooperative protest management strategy between police and protesters to diminish the 
possibility of violence (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; King, 2013). Research suggests that 
coordination and dialog between both parties stimulates mutual respect (Murray, 2010) and 
emphasizes public order, while also promoting legitimate societal perceptions (Gorringe & 
Rosie, 2009; Murray, 2010). Like the transparency component of police legitimacy and 
procedural justice, when police are able to explain their decision-making during protest 
management, they are more likely to be perceived positively (Gorringe & Rosie, 2009; Tyler, 
1990; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Previous strategies of protest management operated through 
extensive social control with little coordination between police and protesters.  
 Emphasizing dialog and planning through relationship building is essential in both 
negotiated management and community policing. Research suggests that this shift in protest 
management is partially oriented toward the popularity of community policing in the 1990s 
(Della Porta & Fillieule, 2004; Gorringe & Rosie, 2008; Vitale, 2005), a decade preceded by a 
complicated history of violence between police and minorities. This strategy attempts to restore 
this complex relationship through community involvement, often accomplished by allocating 
specific officers to designated neighborhoods, which increases familiarity and trust with police 
and provides officers with unique insight into the community’s problems (Bureau of Justice 
Assistance, 1994). Similarly, negotiated management partners specific officers with protest 
leaders, increasing trust in police during protests (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; Gorringe & Rosie, 
2009) and subsequently decreasing the possibility of violence.  
 Previous researchers suggest that negotiated management is derived from community-
oriented policing, but the adoption of these tactics would not have been possible without Wilson 
and Kelling’s (1982) broken windows theory. Cullen (1997) asserts that broken windows was the 
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“blueprint of community policing,” and many suggest that this approach led to a new era of 
inclusive policing in the United States (Xu, Fiedler, & Flaming, 2005). While much research 
emphasizes the link between disorder and crime (Braga et al., 1999; Skogan, 1990), the more 
central elements of broken windows seem to have been understated. Broken windows related 
more closely to community policing than sometimes presented in academic literature. Kelling 
(2019) contends that community policing is often perceived as a soft on crime approach, equated 
with “hug a thug.” However, the community policing approach is driven by community 
concerns, which can evoke more aggressive crime prevention policing. The seminal aspect of 
broken windows, much like community-oriented policing, is the necessity of community input 
and relations to drive police response toward crime (Bratton & Kelling, 2014). This often results 
in communication between police and the community to highlight the issues facing residents.  
 While negotiated management is portrayed a highly desirable strategy by researchers, 
some argue that this approach can be used oppressively. King (2013) offers Occupy Oakland, in 
late 2011, as an example of how attempts to engage in negotiated management, without full 
embrace of its police-protester cooperation principles, can fail if police resort to repressive 
tactics. Police managing this event prohibited food and blankets through the permits issued to 
protesters. Those who violated the prohibition were told to disperse or be subject to arrest. 
Criminalizing the use of food and blankets—protester behaviors typically considered lawful—
led the crowd to rebel, resulting in a violent altercation between police and protesters (King, 
2013).  
 Occupy Oakland highlights the importance of building and maintaining trust between 
police and protesters. When a breakdown of trust occurs or unanticipated behaviors occur within 
the crowd, police are not able to employ cooperative methods. In the absence of cooperative 
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methods, police may turn to crowd management strategies that emphasize formal social control 
(Gillham & Noakes, 2007).  
Strategic incapacitation. Strategic incapacitation typically begins as a coordination 
between police and protesters, but when a breakdown of trust occurs, it combines focused 
aspects of escalated force, spatial containment, and command and control—not against the whole 
crowd, but against problematic groups within the crowd (Bourne, 2011; Gillham, 2011; Gillham, 
Edwards, & Noakes, 2012; Gillham & Noakes, 2007; Schweingruber, 2000). The targeting of 
problematic individuals ensures that police behaviors are focused and are not used 
indiscriminately against an entire crowd (Sousa & Madensen, 2016).  
 Strategic incapacitation is theoretically grounded within the ESIM and the focus 
dimension of the RDFC Interaction Model. Both perspectives contend that police are perceived 
as more legitimate when they target only harmful behaviors rather than generalize their actions to 
the entire crowd (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Eck and Madensen, 2017; Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 
1996; Sousa & Madensen, 2016; Stott & Reicher, 1998). With strategic incapacitation, police 
agencies employ the same dialog-based approach used in negotiated management until the 
transgressive protesters or outside agitators are encountered (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; Gorringe 
& Rosie, 2013; Noakes & Gillham, 2007). Transgressive protesters typically belong to anarchist 
or counterdemonstrator groups, are unfamiliar to police (Gillham, 2011; Gillham, Edwards, & 
Noakes, 2012; Gillham & Noakes, 2007), and engage in unpredictable tactics (Tilly, 2000), 
usually with the aim to incite violence or aggression. Because their presence creates difficulties 
when attempting to engage negotiated management strategies, police target individuals within 
the crowd who pose a legitimate threat to peaceful protest. 
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 The ESIM argues there are multiple social identities present within a crowd, and police 
should only focus their efforts on the problematic identities that hold higher propensities for 
violence. According to this perspective, the problematic individuals within the crowd would be 
transgressive protesters, as their methods are unknown to police prior to the event (Gillham, 
2011; Gillham, Edwards, & Noakes, 2012; Gillham & Noakes, 2007). By focusing police efforts 
on problematic individuals within the crowd, police may be perceived in a less overtly 
authoritative and more legitimate manner. The focused aspect of this strategy leads to more 
favorable public perceptions.  
 Spatial containment against transgressive protesters is executed through the designation 
of hard zones, soft zones, and free-speech zones. Hard zones are areas protesters are prohibited 
from entering to restrict their interactions with protest targets (Gillham, 2011; Gillham, Edwards, 
& Noakes, 2012). The boundaries are frequently sites of contention due to the separation 
between protesters and their targets (Noakes, Klocke, & Gillham, 2005). Soft zones are typically 
adjacent to hard zones and temporarily suspend First Amendment rights (Gillham, 2011). When 
protesters enter soft zones, they declare to the police that they are transgressive protesters 
(Gillham, Edwards, & Noakes, 2012), which provides police the rationale to suspend their First 
Amendment rights and order them to immediately disperse from the event. Disobedience with 
police directives further substantiates the use of force to compel compliance. Finally, free-speech 
zones are locations police allocate as acceptable for the expression of First Amendment rights 
(Gillham, 2011). These areas are typically placed adjacent to the soft zones and outside the 
vicinity of hard zones so there is no possibility of interaction between protesters and targets 
(Gillham, Edwards, & Noakes, 2012). Each serving a specific function to diminish protest 
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violence, these zones are typically utilized when there is an imperative to separate two or more 
groups that have volatile relationships (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; Noakes & Gillham, 2006).  
 Spatial containment and the focused use of force have been characterized by some as 
illegitimate police tactics (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; Gillham, Edwards, & Noakes, 2012; King, 
2013; Noakes & Gillham, 2006). While historically controversial, the use of force and less-lethal 
weapons is sometimes necessary to ensure societal safety, especially when violent agitators are 
present. Much research contends that focusing on problematic individuals is a legitimate 
approach to protest violence (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Eck & Madensen, 2017; Reicher, 1984; 
Reicher, 1996; Sousa & Madensen, 2016; Stott & Reicher, 1998), but it can prove difficult in 
practice because most transgressive protesters are not initially identifiable. An exception is the 
Black Bloc; members of this anarchist group dress the same: blue jeans, a black hooded 
sweatshirt, and a decorative Guy Fawkes mask. They do this to increase their anonymity, but 
police can more easily identify them as problematic individuals. The United States has recently 
seen a resurgence of the Black Bloc, in the left-leaning anti-fascist movement, or Antifa. This 
group poses challenges for U.S. police. However, such anarchists have been around for decades 
in North America and Europe, where police are highly experienced and have reported success in 
Black Bloc protest management. 
Comparative Policing Practices  
Protest management is a complex task, and many U.S. police agencies have struggled to 
find acceptable methods to accomplish it. Other countries have experienced success in 
preventing protest violence, much of it born from the use of dialog to build partnerships with 
protest leaders. Two prevalent practices discussed in conjunction with one another are dialog 
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policing and public order policing, which originated in Sweden and the United Kingdom 
(Gorringe, Stott, & Rosie, 2012) and have spread to other countries due to their popularity. 
 Dialog policing is a cooperative approach that encourages discourse and coordination 
between police and protesters (Gorringe, Stott, & Rosie, 2012). According to David Baker 
(2014), dialog creates an opportunity to set boundaries, limit challenges, and establish 
expectations between police and protesters. Sweden has experienced success through the 
employment of dialog officers because of the amount of training these individuals undergo to 
become certified. Their training utilizes tactics like interviews with protest organizers to 
understand their wants and needs (Wahlstrom, 2007). Coordinating with protesters ensures that 
police practices are transparent, which is essential for police legitimacy (Mazerolle, Bennet, 
Davis, Sargeant, & Manning, 2013; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 1990). Ultimately, the 
Swedish Dialog Police have provided an international example of how to manage protest crowds.  
 In an attempt to emulate this specialized unit, dialog-based approaches have emerged in 
the United States (Baker, 2014; Lovell, 2009), though it still remains a rare approach to U.S. 
protest management. Specific components of the strategy, dialog and coordination, have been 
emphasized in other approaches, such as negotiated management, but those approaches have not 
experienced the same success as dialog policing has elsewhere, due to the lack of extensive 
discourse training in the United States (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; Gorringe & Rosie, 2008).   
 Public order policing (POP) was specifically created to manage crowd events. Like many 
previous policing strategies, this perspective perceives crowds as disorderly and disruptive to the 
community, an inherent threat to the social order (Reicher, Stott, Drury, Adang, Cronin, & 
Livingstone, 2007). Stephen Reicher and colleagues (2007) outline four elements of public order 
policing: intelligence, facilitation, communication, and differentiation. Intelligence refers to 
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being familiar with the social identities of the crowd: police should be aware of who is in the 
crowd and the motivations that drive their participation. This element is heavily derived from the 
ESIM, insinuating that crowds do not experience de-individuation. Rather, police should 
understand that social identities are fluid within a crowd and members typically adopt an identity 
aligned with the morals and values they traditionally hold (Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2003; 
Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 1996; Stott & Reicher, 1998). Facilitation ensures that demonstrator 
goals are considered during the planning process, which can be achieved only through 
cooperation between police and protesters to ensure a safe and successful event. Communication 
facilitates police and protester objectives, diminishing the dissatisfaction among the crowd, 
which, in turn, reduces the likelihood for violent outcomes (Gorringe & Rosie, 2008; Vitale, 
2005; Wahlstrom, 2007). Police legitimacy, procedural justice, and the ESIM all hold that 
increasing transparency in the decision-making process is essential to increasing crowd 
satisfaction (Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2000; Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 1996; Tyler, 1990; Sunshine 
& Tyler, 2003). Dialog should not only be used prior to the event, but also during the event for 
any necessary problem-solving (Gorringe & Rosie, 2008; Gorringe, Rosie, & Stott, 2012). 
Differentiation, the final component of POP, accentuates the social context of crowds. While Le 
Bon (1895) believed that crowds lack social context and their motivations do not impact their 
behavior, proponents of POP assert that protest crowds hold different motivations than spectator 
crowds (Holton, 1978) and these motivations play a role in the possibility of violence (Reicher, 
Stott, Croning, & Adang, 2004; Wahlstrom, 2007). Public order policing is one of the most 
prevalent approaches to crowd management in the United Kingdom because it emphasizes 
societal safety and preparedness for the possibility of violent outcomes (Gorringe, Stott, & Rosie, 
2012).  
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 Police-community relations are also more progressive in other countries than in the 
United States, perhaps partially due to fewer use of force incidents in other countries (The 
Economist, 2014). Several controversial uses of force within the last decade have played a role in 
straining the relationship between police and minority communities, providing additional 
motivation for protest events against U.S. police agencies. This dynamic of protests—police 
tasked with crowd management when they are also targets of the event (Davenport et al., 2011; 
Eisinger, 1973)—is unique, creating additional challenges for police that may not be present in 
other countries.  
This commentary is not to suggest that dialog and public order policing would be 
ineffective in the United States. Rather, these approaches may need to be altered to account for 
the distinctive police-community relations in the United States. There is a constitutional right for 
lawful assembly in the U.S., but there are also negative connotations associated with crowds 
(Blumer, 1968; Le Bon, 1895). Altering how crowd managers perceive crowds is the first step in 
diminishing protest violence, achievable by training them from theoretical perspectives that 
account for social contexts (Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2000; Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 1996; 
Reicher & Stott, 1998). Creating a more positive outlook for lawful assemblies can help 
eliminate the stigma associated with crowds. Second, assuring that crowd dispersal techniques 
are focused on problematic groups will reduce the crowd’s propensity to rebel against police 
(Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2000; Eck & Madensen, 2017; Reicher, 1984; Reicher, 1996; Reicher 
& Stott, 1998; Sousa & Madensen, 2016).  Third, creating trust is essential for any protest 
management strategy (King, 2013), and this can typically be accomplished only when police 
employ transparency in their decision-making process (Mazerolle et al., 2013; Sunshine & Tyler, 
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2003; Tyler, 1990). Through the adoption of these three elements, protest management strategies 
can work to repair community relations and ensure societal safety.  
Policy Research 
 Examining police behavior, particularly the use of discretion, presents a complex 
research task. An immense amount of discretion can be employed during police-citizen 
interactions (Pilavian & Briar, 1964; Sherman & Berk, 1984), as well as a high degree of 
variation in how individual officers approach specific events. Discretion grants police the 
autonomy to decide how much of an effort should be made to enforce specific laws (Goldstein, 
1963) and whether they should approach unlawful behavior from a legalistic or humanistic 
perspective. Legalistic approaches emphasize a strict enforcement of laws with little discretion 
(Wilson, 1978), while a humanistic approach allows for police to utilize discretionary practices 
based on the situation (Carlan & Byxbe, 2000). Because such subjectivity creates difficulty in 
measuring police decision-making, researchers have designed unique methods to assess police 
behavior and discretionary practices.  
 One of these, content analysis, inspects police policies (e.g., those governing vehicle 
pursuits) that outline acceptable officer behavior (Alpert, Kenney, Dunham, & Smith, 2000; 
Bayless & Osborne, 1998; Hicks, 2006; Lum & Fachner, 2008). However, it is important to note 
that police policies do not always align with evidence-based practices. Typically, police policies 
are drafted based on practitioner knowledge of acceptable behavior—a knowledge derived from 
situational experiences rather than data-driven practices. And policies are generally reactive in 
nature, altered based on incidents highly covered in the media. For example, the IACP model 
policy on crowd management and control is regarded as best practice. However, the 
effectiveness of this policy has not yet been directly tested or fully substantiated by research 
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evidence. Still, much of the policy’s content is grounded in existing theoretical frameworks, 
indirect research evidence on police legitimacy, and experiential-based practice. While, many of 
the tactics advocated in the policy are based on professional experience, rather than research 
evidence, practitioner field experience offers an alternative form of evidence that agencies can 
rely upon in the absence of rigorous academic studies.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
METHODS 
 
 This study examines a select cross section of United States police agencies to provide a 
summary of current protest crowd management strategies. This is accomplished by analyzing 
agency policies that direct crowd management practices. Individual agency policies are reviewed 
and analyzed to determine the degree to which individual policies align with best practices and 
current protest management strategies discussed within the literature. An analysis of the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) model policy on crowd management and 
control was conducted to identify specific tactics advocated as best practice for managing 
various protest crowds (e.g., lawful assemblies/demonstrations, civil disturbances). This analysis 
was used to create a coding instrument with items that are used to measure the degree to which 
individual agency policies align with strategies and tactics considered to represent best practices 
in the field (i.e., the IACP model policy). 
 The IACP is the largest global professional organization that attempts to influence police 
practices by promoting positive change among agencies (www.theiacp.org, 2019). One of the 
functions of this international organization is the production of model policies for agencies to 
adopt or to refer to when revising their existing policies. The IACP draws upon the professional 
experience and expertise of influential police executives and leaders, as well as research 
findings, to produce model policies. As the largest professional police organization in the world, 
the IACP plays the role of an unofficial governing agency that greatly influences U.S. police 
organizational policies. Over 30,000 IACP members in more than 150 countries have direct 
access to a library of model policies that govern a wide array of police activities, including 
crowd management and control (www.theiacp.org). 
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 Comparisons between individual agency policies and IACP model policies have been 
conducted in the past, although this method has not yet been employed to examine protest 
management policies. The overarching analytic framework proposed for this study follows the 
methods used by Lum and Fachner (2008) to assess United States police vehicle pursuit policies. 
In their study, a thematic analysis was conducted to identify general themes within the IACP 
model pursuit policy. Following the identification of common themes within the policy, a series 
of dichotomous (yes/no) questions was created to assess the degree of agency policy compliance 
with the IACP model policy themes. This same method was employed to create a coding 
instrument that identifies the degree to which police agency policies align with the IACP’s model 
policy on crowd management and control.  
Alpert and colleagues (1996) contend that efforts should be increased to improve policies 
in specialized areas, stating that there is a lack of data to drive these guidelines. The IACP’s 
model policies provide necessary frameworks to move toward national standards for police 
behaviors in specific contexts (Lum & Fachner, 2008). While the IACP’s model policies are 
based on a combination of research, practitioner expertise, and advisory board input, this is not 
the only organization to produce recommendations for police behavior in specialized contexts. 
There are other organizations, like the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), that outline 
acceptable standards for police conduct in a number of contexts. Recently, PERF has produced a 
best practice guide for police response to mass demonstrations (Police Executive Research 
Forum, 2018). Still, Lum and Fachner (2008) argue that the creation of IACP’s model policies 
represents an important step toward establishing national policing standards. Building upon this 
research, the current study uses methods similar to Lum and Fachner’s and uses the IACP’s 
model policy on crowd management and control, while acknowledging that other best practice 
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standards are available. The purpose of this study is to provide a better understanding of current 
protest management strategies and tactics being used by various police agencies across the 
United States, as well as examine factors that might account for variation in policy content across 
agencies.  
Research Questions  
 As mentioned previously, police can attempt to facilitate lawful assemblies while 
assuring societal safety during protests (Vitale, 2005). Achieving both goals can be difficult 
when individuals participating in lawful assemblies become violent. When protests become 
violent, participant, community, and officer safety supersedes the facilitation of First 
Amendment rights. Therefore, specific police tactics may become necessary that were not 
appropriate to use prior to acts of violence (e.g., arrest, use of force, crowd dispersal techniques). 
In an attempt to outline the context in which specific police tactics are most appropriate, the 
IACP developed a model policy on crowd management and control. This study employs three 
research questions to determine the degree to which current police agencies comply with IACP 
recommendations, assess alignment with protest management strategies, and account for 
variation across agency policies. 
1. To what degree do department policies governing protest management, taken from a 
sample of U.S. police agencies, comply with practices advocated by the IACP model 
policy on crowd management and control? 
This research question explores the degree to which current police policies comply with 
the IACP’s recommendations for crowd management and control. For this study, the IACP’s 
model policy was analyzed to identify tactics they advocate as best practice. The IACP policy 
provides suggestions for how police should approach various circumstances in protest contexts 
 38 
(e.g., lawful assembly, civil disturbances). A 45-item instrument was created to measure agency 
policy compliance with practices recommended by the IACP. Higher scores indicate greater 
compliance with the IACP’s recommendations.  
2. To what degree do agency policies align with theoretically based strategy themes (i.e., 
escalated force, command and control, and negotiated management) identified within 
the IACP model policy? 
This research questions explores the degree to which current police policies align with 
the three general protest management themes identified in the literature review: escalated force, 
command and control, and negotiated management. Previous studies outline specific practices 
used by police to manage protest crowds (Bourne, 2011; Gillham, 2011; King, 2013; 
Schweingruber, 2000; Vitale, 2005). The discourse surrounding these practices notes how police 
approaches to protest management have changed over the past several decades. These 
discussions are typically based on case studies involving general observations of police tactics 
used at specific protests. To date, no empirical study has been conducted to determine the degree 
to which current police policies are aligned with one or more of the general protest strategies 
(i.e., escalated force, command and control, or negotiated management). For this study, specific 
tactics advocated by the IACP model policy on crowd management and control were categorized 
into three themes, each theme representing one of the three general protest strategies. Fifteen 
specific items/questions were then created to code the degree of individual agency policy 
alignment with each of the three themes. Appendix B provides the questions contained in the 
coding instrument, as well as a reference to the source statements in the IACP model policy and 
justification for theme categorization (i.e., why a specific item was created to assess alignment 
with a particular protest management strategy).  
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The United States operates under a decentralized policing structure. As such, variation 
among the policies of individual agencies is expected. The analysis answers the following 
question to attempt to understand existing differences in practices across agencies.  
3. Are agency- and jurisdiction-level characteristics associated with the overall degree of 
compliance and reliance on strategy themes within the IACP model policy? 
Past studies on protest violence acknowledge that event-specific factors are often related 
to the likelihood of protest violence. As such, studies often acknowledge the impact that police 
can have on aggression within the crowd (Bourne, 2011; Davenport et al., 2011; Gillham, 2011; 
Eisinger, 1973; King, 2013; Schweingruber, 2000). This study examines the association between 
agency-level characteristics that might influence police perspective or ability to adhere to current 
best-practice strategies. Agency-level characteristics that will be examined include measures of 
agency size, percentage of black officers, percentage of minority officers, officer educational 
attainment, agency militarization, the adoption of community policing strategies, use of force 
strategies, and the presence of specialized units.  
Like agency-level characteristics, jurisdictional characteristics have not previously been 
examined in relation to police protest management policies. Yet, previous research suggests that 
community characteristics could theoretically influence the tactics adopted by specific police 
agencies (Isaac et al., 1980; Nilson & Nilson, 1980; Walgrave Rucht, & Van Aelst, 2010). As 
such, differences among crowd management policies could be associated with community 
characteristics, including violent crime rate, population size, educational attainment, 
unemployment rate, poverty level, and percentage of black residents. In addition, there may be 
regional differences in the level of compliance with the IACP model policy and general protest 
management strategies. Previous research suggests that protest violence varies by region. With 
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violence occurring more frequently in specific regions, it is hypothesized that there are also 
regional differences in the content of policies that agencies adopt to respond to civil 
disturbances.  
Data Collection 
 Data in this study are collected from multiple sources: current police policies governing 
crowd management for demonstrations/civil disturbances (i.e., policies provided by individual 
agencies), consolidated information from the 2013 Law Enforcement Management and 
Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey, the 2017Uniform Crime Report (UCR), the 2017 
American Community Survey (ACS), and the Defense Department’s Defense Logistics 1033 
program datasets. The specific variables to be collected from each data source on protest 
management tactics, agency-level characteristics, and jurisdiction-level characteristics are 
described below.  
Protest management policies. Policies and procedures on protest management tactics 
were collected for a specific cross section of U.S. police agencies. Policies pertaining to protest 
management include directives on First Amendment gatherings, civil disturbances, canine units, 
use of force, less-lethal weapons, arrest procedures, and civil disturbance units/mobile field 
forces. These policies provide detailed information on protest management tactics that officers 
are directed to engage in for lawful assemblies and violent civil disturbances. These policies 
describe specific tactics, including planning for demonstrations, provisions for use of force, and 
spatial containment during protest events. Protest management policies were collected online 
through department-specific and third-party websites. For policies not readily accessible online, 
a formal public information request was submitted directly to the police agency. For those, 
policy requests that were denied, the associative agency was excluded from the sample and a 
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new agency was selected. More information about the sampling method is provided later in this 
chapter. Additionally, the IACP’s model policy on crowd management and control was obtained 
through the IACP’s website.  
Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS). Data on 
agency-level characteristics were collected through the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ 2013 Law 
Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey. This dataset compiles 
information on over 3,000 agencies within the United States and includes agencies with over 100 
sworn personnel (Hyland, 2018). The 2013 data are the most recently available data provided by 
the Bureau of Justice Statistics. While these data were released pre-Ferguson (November 2014), 
and it is entirely possible that agencies updated their practices in response to this event, this 
dataset still provides the most recent data available. The LEMAS data set is considered the most 
comprehensive and highest-quality data on police administrative statistics. To ensure that this 
data would be available for analysis, the sample of police agencies used in this study was drawn 
from agencies represented in this dataset.1  
Uniform crime report (UCR). Jurisdictional crime data were obtained from the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation’s 2017 Uniform Crime Report (UCR) for all jurisdictions of agencies 
included in the current study. These data include crimes reported by agencies to the FBI between 
January 1, 2017 and December 1, 2017. The Part I crime rate reported per 100,000 populations 
was collected to assess the relationship between crime levels and adherence to the IACP model 
policy and strategy themes. The Uniform Crime Report is one of the nation’s leading data 
sources on crime rates in the United States (Berg & Lauritsen, 2016). This dataset measures the 
                                                 
1 While the agencies in this dataset represent only about 10% of the overall population of police 
agencies, a much larger proportion of the agencies of interest (i.e., those serving jurisdictions 
with 25,000 or more residents; approximately 80%) are included in this dataset. 
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amount of crime in the United States as reported by police agencies. Approximately 95% of all 
police agencies in the United States report crime statistics to the UCR (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2017).  
American community survey (ACS). The U.S. Census Bureau’s 2017 American 
Community Survey (ACS) was utilized to collect data on jurisdiction-level characteristics. The 
ACS is conducted annually in the United States to gather demographics for citizens at the 
county, city, state, and national level. This dataset includes variables like median income, 
educational attainment, and percentage of Black community residents within a jurisdiction. The 
ACS is one of the most comprehensive sources of data on community demographics in the 
United States. The sample included in the 2017 survey represents over two million households 
and reports a 95% response rate (Torrieri, 2018).  
Department of defense: Defense logistics agency 1033 program. The Department of 
Defense’s Defense Logistics Agency 1033 program dataset was utilized to examine militarized 
costs by U.S. police agencies. This dataset provides descriptions and costs of militarized 
equipment for specific police agencies in the United States. The 1033 program allows the 
transference of Department of Defense property that might be destroyed to state and local police 
agencies. The data included in this dataset range from January 1, 2000 to September 30, 2015.  
Sample and Population 
 As discussed previously, this study examines a select sample of U.S. police agencies to 
understand current police approaches to protest management. Specifically, this study examines 
agencies with jurisdictional populations of over 25,000 citizens. According to the BJS’ 2013 
LEMAS data, there are 867 police agencies that serve populations with 25,000 citizens or more 
(Hyland, 2018). The list of police agencies responding to the 2013 LEMAS survey, which 
 43 
provides administrative statistics on U.S. police agencies, was used to draw a sample of agencies 
for the current study. Selecting agencies from this dataset ensures that those included in the 
sample also have agency-level characteristics available for analysis. The response rate for the 
2013 LEMAS survey was 80% and included 2,780 agencies in the United States (Reaves, 2015). 
 In order to include a diverse cross section of U.S. police agencies, sample selection is 
stratified by both jurisdictional population size and region of the United States. Disproportionate 
stratified sampling is used to examine the variation of agencies across the United States. This 
sampling strategy is especially useful to provide detailed analyses on small samples (Daniel, 
2012). Agencies are first stratified according to jurisdiction population, which created five strata: 
agencies policing populations of 25,000–49,999, 50,000–99,999, 100,000–199,999, 200,000–
499,999, and 500,000+. Following this, agencies are then stratified by region of the United 
States. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, there are four regions of the United States: West, 
Midwest, South, and Northeast. Table 1illustrates the number of agencies that are selected within 
each category. Appendix B provides a list of agencies that were selected within each strata. 
  The sample consists of all agencies that serve populations of more than 500,000, often 
referred to as super agencies, since protests are more likely to take place in large urban areas 
(Eisinger, 1973; Walgrave, Rucht, & Aelst, 2010). Thirty-nine of the 44 super agencies are 
included in the current sample. Policies for 5 super agencies were not obtainable due to requests 
for agency policies being denied. All other agencies were given unique identifiers and randomly 
selected, through a random number generator, for analysis within each region for each of the four 
remaining population strata (n = 5 for each population/region strata). Note that the stratum for 
Northeastern agencies serving populations between 200,000 and 499,999 citizens contains only 
five agencies, so the entire population was selected for analysis. However, two of the agencies in 
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this stratum denied the public information request based on the policy not existing or not being 
available for public dissemination. 
 
Table 1: Sample Stratification  
 Population Size Region of the United States Sample Size (n) 
500,000 N/A 392 
200,000 – 499,999 West 3 
 Midwest 5 
 South 5 
 Northeast 5 
100,000 – 199,999 West 5 
 Midwest 5 
 South 5 
 Northeast 5 
50,000 – 99,999 West 5 
 Midwest 5 
 South 5 
 Northeast 5 
25,000 – 49,999 West 5 
 Midwest 5 
 South 5 
 Northeast 5 
Total:  N = 117 
  
 
If agency policies were not available online, formal Freedom of Information requests 
were submitted to the agency for the policies of interest. If the request was denied—due to the 
absence of a policy relating to protest crowds or to the policy’s being considered privileged 
information—the agency was then excluded from the sample and a new agency was randomly 
selected. However, this sampling with replacement strategy was not possible for the 
                                                 
2 The super-agency category consists of 44 agencies. Only 39 were available as public 
information. The remaining agencies denied public information requests, citing these policies as 
law-enforcement privileged information.  
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superagencies and 200,000-499,999 Northeast categories due to the entire population being 
selected for analysis.  
This study lacks sufficient power to generalize the findings to all police agencies in the 
United States due to the limited number of agencies included in the final sample (n =117). 
However, this exploratory study will be the first to provide a general picture of police protest 
management tactics across the United States and begin to assess the degree of variation among 
agencies’ crowd management strategies.  
Agencies Not Included in the Sample 
 Overall, 30 agencies were sampled with replacement after policies could not be obtained 
from the initially selected agencies. Agencies were not included in the sample for multiple 
reasons: gave positive indication that their policies would be distributed but never did so (n = 
10), did not respond to the request (n = 8), refused for legal reasons (i.e., not a state resident, 
policies were considered tactical operations plans) (n = 4), or did not have a crowd management 
policy in place (n = 8). Differences were noted for agencies that are included in the sample and 
those that could not be included in this study3. However, the sampling method used in this study 
was designed to maximize differences between the agencies examined in the sample. This study 
does not attempt to generalize findings to all U.S. police agencies.   
Variables 
Independent variables. The independent variables for this study include agency- and 
jurisdiction-level characteristics. While previous research has examined policies governing 
police behavior within specific contexts (e.g. police pursuits), the literature rarely identifies 
                                                 
3Analyses reveal that agencies for which policies could not be obtained were typically larger, had 
fewer black officers, served jurisdictions with fewer high school graduates, and served 
jurisdictions with higher unemployment and poverty rates. 
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factors that lead agencies to adopt specific policies. This study will explore whether particular 
agency or jurisdiction characteristics are associated with the adoption of tactics emphasized 
within the IACP’s model policy or various protest management strategies.  
The first variable employed is size of agency, which is operationalized as the number of 
full-time sworn personnel within an agency. Cordner (1989) contends that larger agencies tend to 
allocate more personnel to specialized units, which results in the possibility that these agencies 
receive more training in these areas. Previous research suggests that larger agencies are more 
likely to adopt policies pertaining to special areas (Lum & Fachner, 2008). Larger agencies 
typically have more resources, which can be used for training if new policy directives are 
adopted. Additionally, larger agencies also have more recourses to create the types of specialized 
units that are referenced in best practice policies. As such, larger agencies may be more likely to 
continually revise policies and adopt current best practices for protest management. Agency size 
is examined to determine the level of association with specific differences in protest management 
policies.  
 Measures representing minority and black officers within the agencies are continuous 
variables indicating the percentage of sworn officers who are members of these communities. 
This measure is indicative of the extent to which an agency contains diversity in their ranks. 
Within recent years, agencies have become especially focused on diversifying their organizations 
to become more representative of the communities they police (Peak & Sousa, 2018). As such, 
agencies with more diversity may be more likely to adopt tactics that align with more 
progressive protest management strategies.  
 Educational attainment is operationalized by examining the percentage of officers with a 
Bachelor’s degree or higher. This measure, available through the 2013 LEMAS dataset, is 
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operationalized as a continuous variable to examine the education level of sworn officers within 
each agency. Increasing levels of educational attainment is another recent focus within police 
agencies to diversify and reduce the amount of force used by officers. As mentioned previously, 
research shows that officers with higher levels of educational attainment are more likely to use 
reasoning skills and engage in de-escalation practices before using force (Oliva, Morgan, & 
Compton, 2010). Additionally, agencies with better educated officers are more likely to have 
positive community relations (Peak & Sousa, 2018), which leads to greater levels of trust 
between community residents and police. Given that the IACP model policy promotes the use of 
de-escalation tactics and negotiated management practices, agencies with better educated officers 
and community relations may find it easier to align their policies with these recommendations. 
The use of dialog within protest contexts is promoted as a method to diminish the likelihood of 
violence (Gorringe, Stott, & Rosie, 2012). 
 While the use of dialog has been associated with lower rates of protest violence, police 
militarization has been associated with increased aggression (Wood, 2014). Police militarization 
has been a controversial topic for many years, especially after the use of militarized tactics 
during the Ferguson riots (Kiker, 2014; Rickford, 2016). Kraska (2007) defines police 
militarization as “the process of arming, organizing, planning, training for, threatening, and 
sometimes implementing violent conflict” (p. 503). Wood (2014) suggests that police 
militarization during protests has increased since September 11, 2001. Since the events on this 
day, police have been especially concerned with protests becoming security threats, and 
militarized agencies are more concerned with dispersing antagonistic crowds in order to prevent 
potential threats from escalating (Ullrich, 2017). Agencies that spend more on militarization may 
be more willing and able to adopt recommended best practices or specific tactics associated with 
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escalated force. Militarization is measured based on the amount of money agencies spend on 
militarized equipment, standardized per officer, as available through the DOD’s 1033 program. 
This measure offers a picture of the degree of agency militarization, while also accounting for 
size and budgetary differences by standardizing the cost per officer. 
 Agency adoption of community policing strategies is measured through a series of items 
that examine community policing practices within the agency. Research has long confirmed a 
link between community characteristics and crime. This link affects how police maintain order 
and enforce laws in the community. Areas that are more socially disorganized (i.e., higher 
minority populations, crime rates, unemployment rates, and poverty levels) typically receive 
more police services. Recent findings suggest that community characteristics may also influence 
police reaction to protests. For instance, research suggests that Black Americans are perceived by 
police as more threatening during protests (Davenport et al., 2011). This may influence the types 
of policies and general strategies adopted by agencies, but no research has yet been conducted to 
test this assumption. First, whether the organization has a community policing focus in their 
written mission statement is examined. This variable, available in the 2013 LEMAS dataset, is 
coded as such: a written mission statement is absent or does not have a focus on community 
policing (0) or community policing is emphasized in the statement (1). Two other measures of 
community policing examine if recruits and current officers receive eight hours or more of 
community-oriented policing training. This variable provides a measure of the proportion of 
officers who receive this amount of training: (0) less than half or (1) over half. Finally, whether 
officers are regularly assigned to specific beats is measured dichotomously as yes (1) or no (0). 
This measure represents the familiarity between officers and the communities they police. 
Additionally, the percentage of officers routinely engaging in patrol within the same areas is 
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examined. This continuous measure assesses the proportion of the agency who is routinely 
responsible for the same area. Community policing is often linked with specific protest 
management strategies, including negotiated management (Lough, Halliday, & Dobrzynski, 
2010).  
 Police use of force and the discretion associated with employing force is often 
controversial. The IACP model policy includes multiple directives on the use of force in crowd 
contexts (IACP, 2014). As such, agencies that authorize all officers to use various methods of 
force may be more willing to adopt IACP model policy directives related to specific use of force 
guidelines. Agency use of force strategies are measured through agency responses concerning 
whether all sworn officers (1) or only some or no sworn officers (0) are authorized to use each of 
the following types of force: less-lethal weapons, impact projectiles, chemical agents, or physical 
force. The 2013 LEMAS survey asked specific questions about the use of various types of 
physical force, including open hand, closed hand, restraint, and takedown use of force techniques 
(Hyland, 2018). Each of these will be examined independently.  
 Specialized training and units can prove beneficial for police agencies. For example, 
agencies with mobile field forces have units trained specifically to respond to civil disturbances 
(Carter, 2002). The presence of specialized training will be measured through two 2013 LEMAS 
survey items. First, whether the agency does (1) or does not (0) have dedicated personnel trained 
to engage in special operations (e.g., SWAT, SRT) is included. Second, the specific number of 
specialized units within the agency overall will be examined. Each of these variables help 
measure the degree to which officers receive training for specialized contexts.  
 The violent crime rate of each selected jurisdiction is compiled through the FBI’s 2017 
Uniform Crime Report. This variable will be operationalized as the number of Part I crimes 
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reported per 100,000 population. As protest research often examines the occurrence of violence 
during these events, the jurisdiction’s violent crime rate may be indicative of the likelihood of 
these incidents during protests and may influence police response. This study will examine the 
relationship between jurisdictional violent crime rates and differences in police protest 
management strategies.  
 Research suggests that most protests occur in urban environments and many activists 
engaging in protest are university students (Walgrave et al., 2010). Further, there are often 
negative stigmas associated with those who choose to engage in activism, sometimes related to 
the job status of protest participants. Population size, percentage of high school graduates (e.g., 
those who may be eligible to attend college), unemployment rate, and percentage of the 
population that falls below the poverty level is examined using ACS data to determine if these 
jurisdictional characteristics are associated with differences in police protest management 
strategies.  
As many recent protests are related to Black Lives Matter (Rickford, 2016), this study 
examines the relationship between differences in police policies and the level of racial diversity 
in the jurisdiction. Larry Isaac and colleagues (1980) contend that members of the black 
community are more likely to resort to violence during protests because of the perceived lack of 
legitimate options to be heard. This, in turn, may promote the adoption of specific policing 
tactics. To assess the relationship between population diversity and police practice, the 
percentage of black residents within each jurisdiction is obtained from the 2017 ACS.  
Dependent variables. The dependent variables represent the degree of compliance with 
the IACP model policy, as well as adherence to specific protest policing themes for each 
specified agency. Dependent variables are measured using a coding instrument that includes the 
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questions contained in Appendix B. Each item requires a dichotomous response (i.e., yes or no). 
The general degree of compliance with the model policy for each agency policy is measured by 
the total number of items (n = 45) coded as “yes” (1) or “no” (0). Measures of the degree to 
which each agency’s policy adheres to a specific protest management theme—negotiated 
management, command and control, or escalated force—is assessed using the responses to items 
contained in each section of the coding instrument (n = 15 for each theme/strategy). The 
justification column in Appendix B notes when reverse coding is used to reflect adherence to a 
specific theme. The resulting scale scores, for overall compliance as well as each theme, are used 
to assess degree of compliance with the IACP model policy (range = 0 – 45), as well as level of 
alignment with the three existing protest management strategies (range = 0 -15).  
Analytical Plan 
 This study employs both qualitative and quantitative analytical methods to explore the 
degree of compliance with the IACP model policy and protest policing themes. Initially, the 
IACP model policy on crowd management and control was subjected to a thematic analysis to 
identify frequently discussed tactics and themes. This analysis was used to develop questions and 
produce the coding instrument used in the current study. First, questions were created to 
represent the IACP’s model policy recommendations concerning the use or restriction of specific 
protest policing tactics. These items were then categorized based on the existing theoretical 
protest policing approaches to create themes (i.e., negotiated management, escalated force, and 
command and control). Finally, 15 items that best captured the essence of each theme were 
selected to create the final 45-item coding instrument.  
 Descriptive statistics are provided to assess the degree of compliance with the IACP 
model policy, as well as the level of adherence to each of the three protest management themes. 
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These analyses help to determine the degree of variation across current crowd management 
policies adopted by the selected U.S. police agencies. It also begins to describe the degree to 
which any one particular protest management strategy is currently used over others.  
 Bivariate correlations and linear regression models assess the relationship between 
agency- and jurisdiction-level characteristics with degree of compliance with the IACP model 
policy and reliance on the three protest management strategies. Linear regression models are 
generally employed to examine the effect of a set of attributes on a continuous dependent 
variable (Montgomery, Peck, & Vining, 2012). In this study, the dependent variables utilize 
continuous values that are representative of the degree of compliance with the IACP model 
policy and the levels of reliance with negotiated management, command and control, and 
escalated force. Due to the continuous nature of the scales used to measure the dependent 
variables, linear regression is the most appropriate analysis for this study. Additionally, due to 
the small sample size (which increases the likelihood of Type II error) and the exploratory nature 
of this study, there is sufficient reason for statistical significance to be measured at a .10 alpha 
level (two-tailed) in the current analyses (Labovitz, 1968; Sliva, 2015). 
Interrater Reliability 
 The subjectivity of content analyses is often discussed as a limitation relating to 
reliability (Patton, 2015). To control for the subjectivity of this study, two researchers separately 
coded the agency policies. Coding of agency policies occurred simultaneously between the 
researcher and an outside coder over a month-long period. The researcher provided the outside 
coder with the purpose of the study, the coding scheme, and content analysis procedures. The 
outside coder was a first-year doctoral student at the same academic institution as the researcher. 
The results of the coding analysis showed that the coders agreed on approximately 87% (.866) of 
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the overall items. Following the coding analysis, a neutral third party re-analyzed discrepancies 
and made a formal decision on which coding was more accurate. This coding was then used for 
the policy analysis. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
FINDINGS 
 
 This dissertation examines three research questions relating to how police manage protest 
crowds. The current study attempts to answer 1) To what degree do department policies 
governing protest management, taken from a sample of U.S. police agencies, align with practices 
advocated by the IACP model policy on crowd management and control?, 2) To what degree do 
these policies align with theoretically-based strategy themes (i.e., negotiated management 
command and control, and escalated force) identified within the IACP model policy?, and 3) Are 
agency and jurisdiction-level characteristics associated with overall degree of compliance and 
compliance with strategy themes within the IACP model policy?  
 A series of univariate descriptive analyses are used to assess department policies’ degree 
of compliance with the IACP model policy on crowd management and control, as well as the 
level of compliance with theoretically-based strategy themes (i.e. escalated force, command and 
control, and negotiated management). Bivariate correlations evaluate relationships between 
agency/jurisdiction-level characteristics and the extent to which agencies comply with the IACP 
model policy and protest management themes. Finally, regression models employing 
agency/jurisdiction-level characteristics are used to predict compliance with the IACP model 
policy and theory-based themes. Presentation of these findings follows. 
1. To what degree do department policies governing protest management, taken from a 
sample of U.S. police agencies, comply with practices advocated by the IACP model 
policy on crowd management and control? 
Degree of compliance with the IACP model policy is assessed through the use of a 45-
item instrument that asked dichotomous questions relating to whether the policy authorized 
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specific tactics to manage protest crowds. The agencies in this sample scored between 0 and 45 
on this instrument, with a score of 0 representing a policy containing no tactics that align with 
the model policy and a score of 45 representing a policy authorizing the use of 45 tactics 
identified within the IACP model policy.  The mean score for the sample’s overall compliance 
with the IACP model policy is 15.4 (median = 14), indicating relatively low alignment among 
agencies. Figure 1 presents IACP model compliance percentages for each tactic.  
While the average department policies align with only about a third (34.2 percent) of the 
IACP model policy tactics examined, at least two specific tactics advocated by the model policy 
are present in almost all of the sample’s policies. The two requirements found most often in this 
sample are the implementation of the Incident Command System (ICS)/National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) protocols and restrictions on the use of chemical agents (i.e., 
chemical agents are only used when lesser force is ineffective). Both of these tactics are present 
in 93 of the 117 (79.5%) department policies within the sample. These tactics represent opposing 
protest management themes. The ICS/NIMS protocols are routinely used to plan for lawful 
assemblies, which aligns with negotiated management strategies. However, chemical agents are 
used for crowd dispersal during violent incidents, which aligns with escalated force strategies.  
Analysis reveals great variation in degree of compliance across department policies. Only 
one agency has policies that require all 45 crowd management tactics advocated by the IACP 
model policy. The department with the second highest compliance score requires 43 of the 45 
model policy tactics. Policies from two agencies do not require any of the 45 IACP model policy 
tactics. Five of the ten IACP model policy tactics most frequently found in the sample policies 
align with escalated force strategies. These five tactics guide the use of chemical agents 
(79.49%), Tasers (66.47%), and aerosol sprays (64.1%), while also allowing mass arrests  
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Figure 1: Percentage of IACP Compliance by Tactic 
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guidance concerning appropriate tactics for using force against crowds. Among the ten rarest 
IACP model policy tactics found within the sample policies, seven align with command and 
control strategies. The current analyses reveal that command and control strategy tactics (e.g., 
restricting protest activities, spatial containment) are among the least common practices 
contained within this sample’s policies. Policy alignment with particular protest management 
strategies is further explored in the following section.   
2. To what degree do agency policies align with theoretically-based strategy themes (i.e., 
escalated force, command and control, and negotiated management) identified within 
the IACP model policy? 
Three sub-scales within the protest instrument are used to evaluate department policy 
alignment with three general protest management themes. Each sub-scale consists of 15 items, 
with possible scores ranging from 0 to 15. The mean score for the sample’s overall alignment 
with negotiated management tactics – like planning, the use of dialog, and acceptance of protest 
activities – is 5.9 (median = 5), with a range of 0 to 15. As mentioned earlier, the most frequent 
negotiated management tactic found within sample policies is the use of ICS/NIMS protocols 
(79.5%). The U.S. Department of Homeland Security created these protocols to help agencies 
prepare for and respond to special events or disasters. The least adopted negotiated management 
tactic present in policies is the requirement for supervisory approval to enact an arrest. Only 10 
of the 117 sample agencies (8.55%) require supervisory approval for arrest. While the average 
number of negotiated management tactics found in agencies’ policies is relatively low (39.3%), 
six specific tactics are present in about half of the sample. Aside from the most frequent tactic, 
common policy requirements include the necessity of verbal warnings before using physical 
dispersal tactics (53.8%), planning for the possibility of needing additional personnel (51.3%), 
 58 
requiring neutral demeanor for officers (48.7%), specific directives for spontaneous civil 
disturbances (48.7%), and requiring a written action plan for all demonstrations (47%). Figure 2 
presents the percentage of policies containing each negotiated management tactic. 
 
Figure 2: Percentage of Policies Containing each Negotiated Management Tactic 
 
  
The mean score for the sample’s overall alignment with command and control tactics – 
including protest activity restrictions to prevent community disruption and the use of spatial 
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areas following mass arrest (43.6%), prohibition of canine use for crowd control activities 
(27.4%), and restricting bystanders from entering disturbance areas (23.9%). Figure 3 presents 
the percentage of policies containing each command and control tactic.  
 
Figure 3: Percentage of Policies Containing each Command and Control Tactic 
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(56.4%), and requiring arrest for unlawful behavior (53.8%). The common theme among all of 
these tactics is the use of force and arrest to disperse crowds. Only about half of all agencies 
restrict crowd dispersal tactics to disorderly or violent crowds.  
 
Figure 4: Percentage of Policies Containing each Escalated Force Tactic 
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crowd management tactics. This study explores relationships between agency and jurisdictional 
characteristics and the use of particular protest strategies. There is reason to expect that such 
relationships exist. For instance, previous literature highlights the relationship between agency 
adoption of community-oriented policing and the use of the negotiated management strategy 
(Lough et al., 2010), agency use of force experiences and the adoption of the escalated force 
strategy (McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Schweingruber, 2000), and the 
availability of specialized units and the use of the command and control strategy (Vitale, 2005). 
Pearson’s r correlation values and linear regression models are used to examine these and other 
possible relationships.  
Correlations 
Agency level characteristics. Pearson’s r correlation reveals significant relationships 
between six agency-level variables and alignment with the IACP model policy. A weak positive 
correlation is found for the number of sworn officers (r = .53, p < .10), implying that as the size 
of an agency increases, so does degree of compliance with the IACP model policy. Two 
variables commonly linked with a community policing focus are associated with model policy 
compliance. The diversity of the agency matters; a weak positive correlation exists between 
departments with more black officers and degree of compliance (r = .188, P < .05). Agencies that 
utilize information from community surveys also have higher compliance scores (r = .162, p < 
.10). Further, three specific use of force variables are associated with model policy compliance. 
Agencies with use of force policies authorizing soft projectiles (r = .182, p < .10), chemical 
agents (r = .180, p < .10), and leg hobbling techniques (r = .203, p < .05) have higher degrees of 
IACP model policy compliance. The model policy restricts the use of these types of force to 
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situations in which alternative tactics would be ineffective. As such, these restrictions would 
only be adopted by agencies that authorize their officers to use these types of force. 
Many of these same variables are correlated with the adoption of specific protest 
management strategies and related tactics. For instance, agencies that use information from 
community surveys (r = .158, p < .10), authorize the use of chemical agents (r = .210 , p < .05), 
or allow the use of leg hobbling techniques (r = .191, p < .05) are likely to use more negotiated 
management tactics. Previous research suggests that agencies with more educated officers may 
be more likely to adopt negotiated management strategies (Lough et al., 2010). The current study 
supports this finding. As the percentage of officers in a department with a bachelor’s degree 
increases, so does alignment with negotiated management tactics (r = .229, p < .05).  
Significant relationships exist between five agency-level variables and the adoption of 
command and control strategies. First, larger agencies are more likely to adopt command and 
control tactics (r = .223, p < .05). Like previous models, agency percentage of black officers (r = 
.225, p < .05) and percentage of minority officers (r = .206; p < .05) are moderately correlated 
with command and control crowd management. Further, there is a moderate relationship between 
agencies use of community surveys and the adoption of command and control tactics (r = .205, p 
< .05). Only one use of force variable is significant; the association with use of chemical agents 
is weak and positive (r = .173, p < .10).  
While multiple agency-level characteristics are correlated with the adoption of negotiated 
management and command and control strategies, only one is related to escalated force. When 
agencies are authorized to use soft projectiles, reliance on escalated force tactics decrease (r = -
.160, p < .10). This negative relationship implies that while many agencies have authorized the 
use of impact projectiles, not all policies place restrictions on the use of these types of weapons. 
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Table 2 provides Pearson r values for correlations between all agency-level variables and 
model/strategy compliance.  
 
Table 2: Agency-Level Characteristic Correlations 
Variable IACP 
Compliance 
Negotiated 
Management 
Command and 
Control 
Escalated Force 
Number of Full-
Time Sworn 
Personnel 
 
.153* .070 .223** -.068 
Percent Black, 
by Agency 
 
.141 .079 .225** .090 
Percent 
Minority, by 
Agency 
 
.188** .128 .225** -.028 
Percent 
Bachelor’s 
Degree, by 
Agency 
 
.121 .229** -.003 .135 
Militarized 
Equipment Cost 
by Officer 
 
-.132 -.144 -.080 -.026 
C.O.P. Recruit 
Training 
 
-.037 -.102 .083 .088 
C.O.P. In 
Service Training 
 
-.065 -.026 -.104 .085 
Officers 
Regularly 
Assigned to 
Same 
Beats/Areas? 
 
.078 .042 .118 .012 
Percent of 
Officers 
Regularly 
Assigned to 
-.016 -.027 .009 -.134 
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Same 
Beats/Areas? 
 
Agency Utilized 
Information 
From 
Community 
Survey? 
 
.162* .158* .205** -.024 
Authorization 
for Use of 
Batons 
 
.039 .013 .031 -.139 
Authorization 
for Use of 
Impact Weapons 
 
.061 .087 .048 .064 
Authorization 
for Use of Soft 
Projectiles 
 
.182* .123 .139 -.160* 
Authorization 
for Use of 
Chemical 
Agents 
 
.180* .210** .173* -.071 
Authorization 
for Use of 
Tasers 
 
.036 .008 .034 -.114 
Authorization 
for Use of Neck 
Restraint 
 
-.035 -.057 -.001 -.044 
Authorization 
for Use of Open 
Hand 
Techniques 
 
.052 .042 .014 -.049 
Authorization 
for Use of 
Closed Hand 
Techniques 
 
-.060 -.016 -.148 -.062 
Authorization 
for Use of Leg 
.203** .191** .141 -.112 
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Hobble 
Techniques 
 
Dedicated 
Personnel for 
Special 
Operations 
 
.046 -.004 .100 .036 
Number of 
Specialized 
Units Within 
Agency 
.069 .081 .109 .105 
Note: * p < .10,  ** p < .05, *** p < .01, **** p < .001 
 
Jurisdiction-level characteristics. Table 3 provides Pearson’s r values for all correlations 
between jurisdiction-level variables and alignment with the IACP model policy and protest 
management strategies. At the jurisdiction-level, there is only one variable related to the 
adoption of tactics advocated by the IACP model policy .and alignment with use of negotiated 
management tactics. Agencies located in the Northeast are less likely to comply with the IACP’s 
recommended practices (r = -.163, p < .10) or adopt negotiated management tactics (r = -.197, p 
< .05).  
Three jurisdiction-level variables are related to command and control strategy adoption. 
First, there is a weak relationship between jurisdictional violent crime rate (per 100,000 
population) and an agency’s reliance on command and control practices (r = .194, p < .05). This 
finding indicates that as the violent crime rate increases in a jurisdiction, the agency is more likely 
to adopt command and control tactics. Further, this study finds that when the population increases, 
the adoption of command and control practices increase as well (r = .196, p < .05). This finding 
implies that police serving larger populations may be more restrictive during protests. Reliance on 
command and control tactics may also be attributed to jurisdictional-level diversity. As the 
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percentage of black residents increases, so does reliance on command and control practices (r = 
.221, p < .05).  
Finally, Pearson’s r correlation reveals a relationship between two jurisdiction-level 
characteristics and the adoption of escalated force tactics. First, there is a moderate relationship 
between percentage of black residents and reliance on escalated force practices (r = .227, p < .05). 
This finding indicates that as the percentage of black community residents increases, so does the 
adoption of escalated force tactics. Additionally, agencies in the Western United States adopt fewer 
escalated force tactics (r = .-.161, p  < .10), while agencies in the South utilize more of these 
practices (r = .164, p < .10). This finding supports research that suggests there are regional 
differences in policing styles (Bourne, 2011; Davenport et al., 2011).  
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Table 3: Jurisdiction-Level Correlations 
Variable IACP 
Compliance 
Negotiated 
Management 
Command and 
Control 
 
Escalated Force 
Violent Crime 
Rate (per 
100,000) 
.141 .126 .194** .129 
Unemployment 
Rate, by 
Jurisdiction 
.139 .056 .155* -.033 
Population Size, 
by Jurisdiction 
.096 .030 .196** -.008 
Percent of High 
School 
Graduates, by 
Jurisdiction 
.002 .066 -.084 -.076 
Poverty Level, 
by Jurisdiction 
.081 .085 .058 -.055 
Percent Black, 
by Jurisdiction 
.089 .036 .221** .227** 
West Region .097 .084 .032 -.161* 
Midwest Region -.031 -.018 -.102 -.060 
South Region .089 .116 .122 .164* 
Northeast 
Region 
-.163* -.197** -.083 .008 
Note: * p < .10,  ** p < .05, *** p < .01, **** p < .001 
 
Linear Regression Models 
 Following the examination of Pearson’s r correlations, the data are also examined with 
linear regression models. This study is an exploratory study and the first of its kind to examine 
current policies and how they align with those recommended by the IACP model policy and 
existing protest management strategies. There is little theory, beyond the few research studies 
cited, to suggest which agency or jurisdictional-level variables might be associated with model 
policy adoption or the use of a particular protest strategy. When linear regression is used to 
explore the data, few models in this study are statistically significant. The adjusted R-Squared for 
many of the models is negative, which indicates that the proposed models do not explain 
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dependent variable variance (i.e. IACP model policy compliance, or adoption of negotiated 
management, command and control, or escalated force tactics). Nonetheless, insignificant 
findings and lack of explanatory power provides important findings for future analysis and 
theory building. As such, this dissertation will highlight any statistically significant findings, and 
present general models that do not yield significant results. To begin, two types of agency-level 
regression models are presented. The first includes administrative-related agency-level variables 
(i.e., agency size, diversity, education, and funding spent on militarized equipment). The second 
includes correlates found in previous research that should, theoretically, be related to the 
adoption of particular protest management tactics.    
 Agency-level regression models: Administration focused. The regression model 
examining the relationship between agency-level variables on IACP model policy compliance is 
not statistically significant and the Adjusted R-Square is slightly negative, indicating that no 
variance is explained within the dependent variable. Additionally, there are no significant 
predictors in the model to explain adoption of IACP’s recommended practices. Table 4 provides 
all the model statistics for agency-level variables predicting compliance with the IACP model 
policy. 
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Table 4: Agency-Level Regression Model for IACP Compliance 
Variable Unstandardized 
b 
SE B Standardized 
Β 
Significance 
Level 
Number of 
Full-Time 
Sworn 
Personnel 
.000 
 
.000 .178 .177 
Percent Black, 
by Agency 
.031 .134 .037 .816 
Percent 
Minority, by 
Agency 
-.021 .087 -.039 .811 
Percent 
Bachelor’s 
Degree, by 
Agency 
.119 .084 .178 .162 
Militarized 
Equipment Cost 
by Officer 
.000 .001 -.082 .516 
Adj. R2=-.006, p = .472, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
 The regression model predicting the adoption of negotiated management tactics based on 
agency-level variables is also not statistically significant. However, the Adjusted R-Squared is 
positive and explains about four percent of the variance in the dependent variable. This model 
includes one significant predictor; agencies with higher educational attainment are more likely to 
adopt negotiated management practices (p < .05). Table 5 provides the model statistics for 
agency-level variables predicting alignment with the negotiated management strategy. 
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Table 5: Agency-Level Regression Model for Negotiated Management Compliance 
Variable Unstandardized 
b 
SE B Standardized 
Β 
Significance 
Level 
Number of 
Full-Time 
Sworn 
Personnel 
6.724 E-5 .000 .067 .603 
Percent Black, 
by Agency 
.013 .060 .033 .830 
Percent 
Minority, by 
Agency 
.007 .039 .027 .865 
Percent 
Bachelor’s 
Degree, by 
Agency 
.095 .038 .311** .014 
Militarized 
Equipment Cost 
by Officer 
.000 .000 -.086 .485 
Adj. R2=-.049, p = .605, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
The model predicting the adoption of command and control tactics with agency-level 
characteristics is not statistically significant and the Adjusted R-Square is also negative. Like the 
previous model, there is one significant predictor of the use of command and control tactics. 
Larger agencies are more likely to adopt command and control practices during protests (p < 
.10). Table 6 provides the model statistics for agency-level variables predicting alignment with 
the command and control strategy.  
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Table 6: Agency-Level Regression Model for Command and Control Compliance 
Variable Unstandardized 
b 
SE B Standardized 
Β 
Significance 
Level 
Number of 
Full-Time 
Sworn 
Personnel 
.000 .000 .230* .084 
Percent Black, 
by Agency 
.013 .045 .046 .775 
Percent 
Minority, by 
Agency 
-.005 .029 -.027 .869 
Percent 
Bachelor’s 
Degree, by 
Agency 
.006 .028 .027 .832 
Militarized 
Equipment Cost 
by Officer 
7.602 E-5 .000 -.038 .765 
Adj. R2=-.020, p = .596, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
Finally, the model using agency-level characteristics to predict the adoption of escalated 
force tactics is not statistically significant, but the Adjusted R-Squared is slightly positive, 
accounting for about two percent of the variance in the dependent variable. Unfortunately, there 
are no statistically significant predictors within this model. Table 7 provides the model statistics 
for agency-level variables predicting alignment with the escalated force strategy.  
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Table 7: Agency-Level Regression Model for Escalated Force Compliance 
Variable Unstandardized 
b 
SE B Standardized 
Β 
Significance 
Level 
Number of 
Full-Time 
Sworn 
Personnel 
-6.919 E-5 .000 -.143 .271 
Percent Black, 
by Agency 
.040 .029 .214 .175 
Percent 
Minority, by 
Agency 
.008 .019 .069 .670 
Percent 
Bachelor’s 
Degree, by 
Agency 
.024 .018 .163 .193 
Militarized 
Equipment Cost 
by Officer 
-4.176 E-6 .000 -.003 .980 
Adj. R2= .021, p = .283, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
  
Research-based regression models. The models in this section are driven by previous 
research findings. Variables included in these agency-level models differ based on the dependent 
variable. For instance, community-oriented policing variables are used to assess the association 
with the adoption of negotiated management strategies. To examine the adoption of command 
and control tactics, variables relating to the use and number of specialized units are included in 
the model. Finally, use of force variables included in the LEMAS dataset are integrated used to 
predict adoption of escalated force tactics. 
 First, the community-oriented policing model used to predict the adoption of negotiated 
management tactics is not statistically significant and the Adjusted R-Squared is negative, 
indicating that no variance is explained in the dependent variable. Additionally, there are no 
significant predictors within this model, which implies that the measures of community-oriented 
policing may not truly represent this concept, or that negotiated management may not be 
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theoretically driven by agencies that embrace community-oriented policing, as previously 
suggested. Table 8 provides the model statistics examining the relationship between community-
oriented agency-level variables and the adoption of negotiated management tactics.  
 
Table 8: Community-Oriented Policing Model for Negotiated Management 
Variable Unstandardized 
b 
SE B Standardized 
Β 
Significance 
Level 
Recruit 
Training on 
C.O.P. 
-1.845 1.438 -.140 .203 
Current Officer 
Training on 
C.O.P. 
.130 .996 .014 .896 
Whether 
Officers Are 
Responsible 
For Same Beat 
1.846 1.936 .113 .343 
Percent of 
Agency 
Responsible 
For Same Beat 
-.002 .022 -.009 .938 
Information 
Utilized From 
Community 
Survey 
1.175 .985 .127 .236 
Adj. R2=-.013, p = .580, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
  
  
The next model examines the relationship between specialized units and an agency’s 
adoption of command and control practices. This model is not statistically significant and the 
Adjusted R-Squared does not explain dependent variable variance. Additionally, there are no 
significant predictors in the model. This finding implies that agency use of specialized units may 
not influence the use of command and control strategies. Table 9 provides the model statistics 
examining the relationship between specialized unit agency-level variables and the adoption of 
command and control tactics. 
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Table 9: Specialized Unit Model for Command and Control Reliance 
Variable Unstandardized 
b 
SE B Standardized 
Β 
Significance 
Level 
Whether 
Agency Has 
Dedicated 
Personnel for 
Special 
Operations 
1.263 1.231 .098 .307 
Number of 
Specialized 
Units in the 
Agency 
.019 .018 .096 .317 
Adj. R2= .003, p = .310, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
  
The final model is presented in Table 10. The model assesses the correlation between use 
of force policies and the adoption of escalated force tactics. This model is not significant and the 
Adjusted R-Squared indicates that no dependent variable variance is explained by the model. 
There is one predictor that is on the verge of being statistically significant. Agencies who 
authorize all officers to use impact weapons are more likely to adopt escalated force strategies (p 
= .109). Although insignificant, the current study’s small sample size reduces the power of the 
current analysis. The influence of officer authorization to use impact weapons on escalated force 
strategy adoption might prove important in future studies based on larger samples.  
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Table 10: Use of Force Model for Escalated Force Reliance 
Variable Unstandardized 
b 
SE B Standardized 
Β 
Significance 
Level 
Authorization 
for Use of 
Batons 
-2.529 1.729 -.149 .147 
Authorization 
for Use of 
Impact 
Weapons 
.748 .463 .166 .1094 
Authorization 
for Use of Soft 
Projectiles 
-.851 .626 -.139 .176 
Authorization 
for Use of 
Chemical 
Agents 
-.238 .452 -.053 .600 
Authorization 
for Use of 
Tasers 
-.552 .752 -.076 .465 
Authorization 
for Use of Neck 
Restraints 
-.116 .535 -.022 .829 
Authorization 
for Use of Open 
Hand 
Techniques 
.896 1.460 .074 .541 
Authorization 
for Use of 
Closed Hand 
Techniques 
-.147 .846 -.020 .862 
Authorization 
for Use of Leg 
Hobble 
Techniques 
-.351 .502 -.071 .486 
Adj. R2= -.007, p = .514, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
Jurisdiction-level regression models. The data are examined using linear regression to 
assess the relationship between jurisdiction-level characteristics with IACP model policy 
                                                 
4 When rounding, this finding falls just outside the range of rejecting the null hypothesis. As 
such, I will leave it up to the discretion of the reader as to how to interpret this finding.  
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compliance and reliance on particular protest management strategies. The first model, regressing 
IACP compliance on jurisdiction-level characteristics, is not statistically significant and only 
explains about two percent of the variance in the dependent variable. As presented in Table 11, 
there is only one significant predictor of overall IACP model policy compliance. Agencies located 
in the Western region of the United States are more likely to adopt practices recommended by the 
IACP model policy (p < .10). This finding could be due to the fact that many of the agencies in the 
Western region of the United States contract out their policy construction to private agencies (e.g., 
Lexipol). Eagly & Schwartz (2018) contend that 95% of police agencies in California rely on 
policy manuals constructed by Lexipol. These agencies seem to align with the basic principles 
recommended by the IACP at face value. As such, it is likely that these agencies, hiring private 
organizations, are less likely to deviate from industry-recommended practices.  
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Table 11: Jurisdiction-Level Regression Model of IACP Compliance 
Variable Unstandardized 
b 
SE B Standardized  
Β 
Significance 
Level 
Population Size, 
by Jurisdiction 
1.255E-6 .000 .125 .203 
Percent of High 
School 
Graduates, by 
Jurisdiction 
.231 .156 .155 .141 
Unemployment 
Rate, by 
Jurisdiction 
.421 .477 .100 .380 
Poverty Level, 
by Jurisdiction 
.116 .194 .063 .552 
Percent Black, 
by Jurisdiction 
.038 .079 .061 .628 
Violent Crime 
Rate (Per 
100,000) 
.001 .003 .044 .697 
West 17.670 9.853 .803* .076 
Midwest 13.722 9.969 .464 .172 
South 15.353 9.739 .783 .118 
Northeast 11.011 9.840 .448 .266 
Adj. R2= .027, p = .231, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
Unfortunately, the findings for each of the strategy management models are similar to those 
of the general IACP compliance model. The negotiated management model is not statistically 
significant and only explains about two percent of the variance in the dependent variable. Table 
12 shows that there is only one significant predictor in this model. Jurisdictions with higher levels 
of high school graduates are more likely to follow the principles of negotiated management (p < 
.10).  
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Table 12: Jurisdiction-Level Regression Model for Negotiated Management Compliance 
Variable Unstandardized 
b 
SE B Standardized  
Β 
Significance 
Level 
Population Size, 
by Jurisdiction 
3.347 E-7 .000 .074 .453 
Percent of High 
School 
Graduates, by 
Jurisdiction 
.127 .070 .189* .074 
Unemployment 
Rate, by 
Jurisdiction 
.053 .216 .028 .807 
Poverty Level, 
by Jurisdiction 
.081 .088 .097 .357 
Percent Black, 
by Jurisdiction 
.001 .036 .002 .987 
Violent Crime 
Rate (Per 
100,000) 
.001 .001 .077 .500 
West 6.639 4.460 .667 .140 
Midwest 5.139 4.513 .385 .257 
South 5.917 4.409 .668 .183 
Northeast 3.511 4.455 .316 .432 
Adj. R2= .024, p = .250, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
The command and control model is also not significant and only explains about four 
percent of the dependent variable variance. Table 13 shows that those agencies policing larger 
jurisdictions are more likely to rely on command and control tactics (p < .10). Like the correlations 
explained earlier, larger populations signify more people on the streets for routine activities. When 
protests occur, higher population densities and interactions may increase the chance of community 
disruption during routine activities. Risks associated with increased interactions in larger 
jurisdictions may explain why these agencies rely on more restrictive practices.  
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Table 13: Jurisdiction-Level Regression Model for Command and Control Compliance 
Variable Unstandardized 
b 
SE B Standardized 
Β 
Significance 
Level 
Population Size, 
by Jurisdiction 
5.945 E-7 .000 .185* .059 
Percent of High 
School 
Graduates, by 
Jurisdiction 
.032 .049 .067 .523 
Unemployment 
Rate, by 
Jurisdiction 
.095 .152 .071 .531 
Poverty Level, 
by Jurisdiction 
.007 .062 .011 .913 
Percent Black, 
by Jurisdiction 
.039 .025 .195 .122 
Violent Crime 
Rate (Per 
100,000) 
.000 .001 .055 .625 
West 3.789 3.129 .538 .229 
Midwest 2.129 3.166 .225 .503 
South 3.172 3.093 .505 .307 
Northeast 2.451 3.125 .312 .435 
Adj. R2= .043, p = .144, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
Finally, the escalated force model reveals no significance and the model explains about 
two percent of the variance in the dependent variable. Table 14 reveals that there are no 
significant predictors in this model. As such, this study finds that the jurisdiction-level variables 
selected for this analysis cannot be used to predict the adoption of escalated force tactics.  
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Table 14: Jurisdiction-Level Regression Model for Escalated Force Compliance 
Variable Unstandardized 
b 
SE B Standardized 
Β 
Significance 
Level 
Population Size, 
by Jurisdiction 
1.585 E-7 .000 -.068 .488 
Percent of High 
School 
Graduates, by 
Jurisdiction 
-.035 .036 -.101 .339 
Unemployment 
Rate, by 
Jurisdiction 
-.097 .111 -.101 .381 
Poverty Level, 
by Jurisdiction 
-.048 .045 -.111 .296 
Percent Black, 
by Jurisdiction 
.027 .018 .189 .139 
Violent Crime 
Rate (Per 
100,000) 
.001 .001 .100 .384 
West -2.128 2.290 -.418 .355 
Midwest -2.137 2.317 -.313 .359 
South -1.625 2.264 -.359 .474 
Northeast -1.567 2.287 -.276 .495 
Adj. R2= .016, p = .311, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
Summary 
 This study provides an exploratory and cursory examination of protest management 
tactics and alignment with a model policy and particular management themes. To help guide 
future police protest management research and theory, the significant bivariate correlations and 
linear regression model findings are reiterated and briefly discussed. This summary begins with 
findings related to overall model policy compliance, followed by findings associated with each 
of the three protest management strategy themes. 
 IACP model policy compliance. First, Pearson’s r correlations reveal significant 
relationships with multiple agency-level and a single jurisdiction-level characteristic. Larger 
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agencies tend to rely more on practices advocated by the IACP model policy (r = .153, p < .10). 
These agencies typically have more resources (Carter & Carter, 2009) and are able to use these 
resources to include community input in their policies (Alpert & Smith, 1994; Eagly & Schwartz, 
2018). This input is essential for police to employ legitimate tactics (Sadusky, 2001). 
Community input is the cornerstone of community policing, which has potential to improve 
police-community relations (Bazemore & Schiff, 2015). Diversity within police agencies is also 
advocated by proponents of community policing. This study finds that agencies with more 
minority officers are more likely to adopt practices recommended by the IACP (r = .188, p < 
.05). This diversity is discussed in research as a way for agencies to be more representative of the 
populations that they police (Skogan, 2004), thus reducing tensions between officers and 
community residents. Like other variables representative of community policing, agencies 
utilizing information from community surveys are more likely to adopt practices recommended 
by the IACP (r = .162, p < .10). Each of these findings suggests that agencies that adhere to 
community policing principles also demonstrate greater compliance with the IACP model policy.  
Although it is preferable for police to avoid conflict with protestors, it is important to 
have contingencies in place for interactions that necessitate use of force. Agencies who authorize 
all of their officers to use soft projectiles (r = .182, p < .10), chemical agents (r = .180, p < .10), 
and leg hobbling techniques (r = .203, p < .05) also tend to adopt practices advocated by the 
IACP. Restrictions on the use of physical force, as mentioned previously, are likely to follow 
mass authorization for officers to employ this type of force. Finally, bivariate correlations also 
reveal that agencies in the Northeastern United States are less likely to adopt IACP 
recommended tactics (r = -.163, p < .10). After examining the data, there are no differences 
between variables that were found to be statistically significant for all sample agencies and those 
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within the Northeastern United States. However, it is unlikely that region alone can explain the 
differences in the adoption of IACP recommended practices and those that align with negotiated 
management. As such, future research should examine the relationship between additional 
agency- and jurisdiction-level and the adoption of these tactics.  Conversely, the jurisdiction-
level regression model predicting IACP compliance signifies that agencies in the Western United 
States are more likely to utilize tactics the IACP promotes as best practice (B = .803, p < .10). 
This finding suggests that there is regional variation in the degree of compliance with the IACP’s 
model policy on crowd management and control.  Table 15 presents all significant factors 
associated with IACP model policy compliance. 
 
Table 15: Factors Associated with IACP Model Policy Compliance 
Bivariate Correlations 
Variable r 
Number of Full-Time Sworn Personnel .153* 
Percent Minority, by Agency .188** 
Utilized information from community survey .162* 
Authorization for use of soft projectiles .182* 
Authorization for use of chemical agents .180* 
Authorization for use of leg hobble techniques .203** 
Northeast Region -.163* 
Regression Model Variables 
Variable B 
West Region .803* 
* p < .10, ** p < .05 
 
 Negotiated management strategy. In addition to assessing the correlation between 
agency- and jurisdiction-level variables with IACP compliance, the relationship between each of 
these variables and existing protest management strategies is also examined. Bivariate 
correlations indicate that agencies with officers who have higher educational attainment are more 
likely to adopt negotiated management practices (r = .229, p < .05). This finding highlights the 
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potential benefits of an educated police force. Like the IACP compliance models, this finding 
suggests that some aspects of community policing may be inherently linked with negotiated 
management tactics. This is reinforced by the finding that agencies utilizing information from 
community surveys are also more likely to adopt tactics representative of negotiated 
management (r = .158, p < .10). Also similar to the IACP compliance models, use of force 
variables show significance. Agencies authorizing all of their officers to utilize chemical agents 
(r = .210, p < .05) and leg hobbling techniques (r = .191, p < .05) are more likely to employ 
negotiated management practices during a protest. Finally, like overall IACP model compliance, 
agencies in the Northeastern United States are less likely to adopt negotiated management 
practices (r = -.197, p < .05). Existing theory and research do not provide insight into 
explanations for the relationships between use of force policies and negotiated management, or 
why Northeastern police agencies might be less likely to employ negotiated management 
strategies.  
The regression models for negotiated management tactics reveal two important findings. 
First, agencies with officers who have higher educational attainment rely more on negotiated 
management practices (p < .10). Second, agencies policing jurisdictions with more high school 
graduates are also more likely to adopt negotiated management tactics (p < .10). In previous 
research, contacting and building relationships with protest leaders has been discussed as an 
important police responsibility (King, 2013). However, these relationships can only be built and 
thrive when both parties are willing to cooperate. This finding seems to indicate that education is 
an important factor in negotiated management for both police and community members. Table 
16 presents all significant factors associated with agency adherence to the negotiated 
management strategy.  
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Table 16: Factors Associated with Negotiated Management Strategy 
Bivariate Correlations 
Variable R 
Percent Bachelor’s Degree, by Agency .229** 
Utilized information from community survey .158* 
Authorization for use of chemical agents .210** 
Authorization for use of leg hobble techniques .191** 
Northeast Region -.197** 
Regression Model Variables 
Variable B 
Percent Bachelor’s Degree, by Agency .311** 
Percent of High School Graduates, by Jurisdiction .189* 
* p < .10, ** p < .05 
 
 Command and control strategy. Adoption of command and control tactics is 
significantly associated with nine variables and predicted by two agency- and jurisdiction-level 
variables. First, larger agencies are more likely to adopt tactics aligning with command and 
control (r = .223, p < .05). As mentioned previously, larger agencies have more resources at their 
disposal (Carter & Carter, 2009). As such, these resources may be allocated toward the purchase 
of equipment used for spatial containment (e.g. barricades, shields, etc.). Diversity of the agency 
also matters, as agencies with more black (r = .225, p < .05) and minority officers (r = .225, p < 
.05) are more likely to align with command and control strategies. Like previous models, 
agencies employing information from community surveys were more likely to adopt command 
and control practices (r = .205, p < .05). These findings indicate that agencies focused on 
community policing strategies may be more likely to adopt command and control strategies, as 
well. Additionally, agencies authorizing officers to use chemical agents were more likely to 
adopt tactics relating to command and control (r = .173, p < .10). Chemical agents are typically 
employed in conjunction with the use of command and control strategies (Vitale, 2005). These 
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tactics are commonly utilized to disperse problematic crowds, that have previously been 
subjected to spatial containment.  
While several of the same agency-level variables were associated with IACP model 
policy and negotiated management compliance, jurisdiction-level characteristics seem to differ 
with respect to the adoption of command and control tactics. For instance, agencies policing 
areas with higher violent crime rates tend to rely more on command and control practices (r = 
.194, p < .05). Additionally, those areas with higher unemployment rates utilize these tactics 
more often (r = .155, p < .10). According to Harcourt’s (1998; 2001) strict enforcement 
approach, these areas may be targeted by perceived discriminatory tactics, leading to a heavier 
reliance on restrictive measures. Agencies policing larger jurisdictions also tend to rely more on 
these practices (r = .196, p < .05). Finally, jurisdictions with a higher proportion of black 
residents are more likely to adopt command and control tactics (r = .221, p < .05). While beyond 
the scope of this dissertation, future researchers may want to examine the extent to which racial 
threat theory (Blalock, 1967) could be used to explain these relationships.  
 The regression model examining the relationship between jurisdictional characteristics 
and reliance on command and control signifies that larger agencies (B = .230, p < .10) policing 
larger jurisdictions (B = .185, p < .10) are more likely to adopt these practices. A potential 
explanation was discussed previously; larger populations lead to more interactions within the 
course of routine activities. As such, police may rely on these practices to minimize community 
disruption during protests. Table 17  presents all significant factors associated with agency 
adherence to the command and control strategy. 
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Table 17: Factors Associated with Command and Control Strategy 
Bivariate Correlations 
Variable R 
Number of full-time sworn personnel .223** 
Percent black, by Agency .225** 
Percent minority, by Agency .225** 
Utilized information from community survey .205** 
Authorization for use of chemical agents .173* 
Violent crime rate, by Jurisdiction .194** 
Unemployment rate, by Jurisdiction .155* 
Population size, by Jurisdiction .196** 
Percent black, by Jurisdiction .221** 
Regression Model Variables 
Variable B 
Number of full-time sworn personnel .230* 
Population size, by Jurisdiction .185* 
* p < .10, ** p < .05 
 
Escalated force strategy. Pearson’s r correlations reveal four significant bivariate 
relationships and one predictor approaching significance associated with police adoption of 
escalated force tactics. Agencies authorizing the use of soft projectiles are less likely to rely on 
escalated force tactics (r = -.160, p < .10). This finding indicates that not all agencies within the 
sample that authorize impact munitions place restrictions on their use. Theoretically, those 
agencies that do not stipulate that impact weapons should not be fired indiscriminately into the 
crowd align with the escalated force model (McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; 
Schweingruber, 2000). Additionally, agencies policing jurisdictions with more black community 
members tend to rely more on the use of escalated force practices (r = .227, p < .05). Like 
command and control, racial threat theory (Blalock, 1967) may also be used to explain why 
escalated force tactics are more likely to be used to manage protests in jurisdictions with larger 
proportions of black residents. Finally, while agencies in the Western United States are less 
likely to adopt escalated force tactics (r = -.161, p < .10), those in the South adopt these practices 
 87 
more often (r = .164, p < .10). Once again, findings suggest that there is regional variation in 
police protest management strategies.  
The model testing the correlations with agency-level characteristics and reliance on escalated 
force tactics indicates that those agencies authorizing the use of impact weapons were more 
likely to align with escalated force practices (B = .109, p = .109). Although just short of reaching 
significance at the p = .10 level, this finding deserves further researcher attention. Impact 
weapons are often used for crowd dispersal. Since escalated force strategies focus on means of 
crowd dispersal, it follows that there is a relationship between these two variables. Table 18 
presents all significant factors associated with agency adherence to the escalated force strategy. 
 
Table 18: Factors Associated with Escalated Force Strategy 
Bivariate Correlations 
Variable r 
Authorization for use of soft projectiles -.160* 
Percent black, by Jurisdiction .227** 
West Region -.161* 
South Region .164* 
Regression Model Variables 
Variable B 
Authorization for use of impact weapons .109t 
p = .109 t, * p < .10, ** p < .05  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 This dissertation examines three specific research questions governing the use of police 
protest management tactics in the United States. The research questions examined in this study 
assess the degree of policy compliance by police agencies with recommended IACP practices, 
the use of tactics aligning with the three existing protest management tactics, as well as the 
relationship between agency-/jurisdiction-level characteristics and the use of these tactics. This 
chapter begins with a brief discussion of the overall findings from this study. This discussion 
interprets and emphasizes how previous research relates to this dissertation’s findings. The 
discussion concludes by considering how the associations between agency-/jurisdiction-level 
characteristics and the use of strategy tactics align with three major topics: community-oriented 
policing, strict enforcement and use of force, and regional variation.  
This section also describes the strengths and limitations, as well as the implications of the 
current study. The implications into two sections. First, policy implications are offered to explain 
how this study may impact the field of policing. Second, directions for research are considered, 
and special attention is given to how the assumptions made in this study point to future avenues 
for research on protest violence. Finally, this dissertation concludes with final thoughts on the 
significance of the current work and how this study expands upon existing knowledge. 
Discussion 
 This study attempts to identify current protest management practices and strategies used 
by police agencies across the United States. It is the first study that seeks to determine the degree 
to which these policies differ from each other, as well as from policies considered to represent 
best practices within the policing field. Police influence on protest outcomes, including violence, 
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has been established by research since the 1970’s (Davenport et al., 2011; Eisinger, 1973). 
Research has also deeply explored various theoretical frameworks of protest management 
strategies (Bourne, 2011; Gillham & Noakes, 2007; King, 2013; Schweingruber, 2000; Vitale, 
2005). To date, these strategies have been presented as fitting neatly across a historical timeline, 
with one strategy replacing another as new strategies emerge. This study questions the accuracy 
of this sequential presentation of strategy adoption and replacement. It is the first systematic 
documentation of current U.S. police protest management policies that demonstrates the degree 
to which agencies rely on a variety of management tactics. This dissertation reports the degree to 
which a sample of agencies adhere to best practice standards, and reveals that these agencies use 
tactics that stem from three different management strategies.  
 Protest management has historically been a controversial aspect of policing. Many police 
crowd management tactics have been questioned by scholars and the public. The complexities of 
demonstration management contribute to on-going dialog about the need to improve policing 
practices with regard to crowd management and control. Managing protest crowds requires that 
attention be given to several potentially competing priorities, including preserving constitutional 
rights, preventing crowd violence, and ensuring officer and societal safety. Police face the unique 
challenge of balancing each of these goals without sacrificing one to achieve another.  
The methods employed within this study emulate those used by Lum & Fachner (2008) to 
study agency policies governing police pursuits. Like Lum & Fachner, this study uses an IACP 
model policy as a focal point from which to compare existing agency policies. The IACP model 
policy on crowd management and control was subjected to a content analysis. This analysis was 
then used to identify tactics promoted by the IACP as best practice, and a 45-item coding 
instrument was created. Dichotomous items were used to assess agency policy adherence to the 
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IACP’s recommendations concerning the use of specific tactics. The data are described and 
analyzed using descriptive statistics, bivariate correlations, and linear regression models in an 
attempt to answer three specific research questions. The findings of this study will be discussed 
in relation to each of these research questions.  
1. To what degree do department policies governing protest management, taken from a 
sample of U.S. police agencies, align with practices advocated by the IACP model 
policy on crowd management and control? 
While the data were examined using a variety of statistical analyses, (univariate, 
bivariate, and multivariate), arguably, the most impactful findings stem from basic descriptive 
statistics that reveal the degree to which existing police policies adhere to tactics recommended 
by the IACP and to three different protest management strategies. These findings identify 
differences among the specific tactics used by a sample of U.S. police agencies to manage 
protests.  
Overall, U.S. police agency policies show relatively low compliance with the tactics 
IACP promotes as best practice. The average agency policy adheres to about one-third of 45 
tactics identified within the IACP model policy (31.1%). The most frequently adopted practices 
within this sample align with the escalated force model of protest management (53.3%). As such, 
many of the sample agencies provide guidance on the use of force during civil disturbances. 
While policy statements governing the use of escalated force tactics are the most common within 
this sample, command and control tactics are only implemented half as often (26.7%). Command 
and control tactics relate to the use of spatial containment and constraining the time, place, and 
manner of protests (Vitale, 2005). On average, agencies adopt about one-third (33.3%) of 
negotiated management tactics examined in this study. Negotiated management advocates the 
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use of planning and dialog to facilitate First Amendment rights for participants while 
maintaining public safety (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; King, 2013). Overall, police agencies 
appear most concerned with providing guidance on use of force during protests, should force 
become necessary. Following this, policies promote tactics to facilitate peaceful and lawful 
assemblies. Finally, and least frequently, policies emphasize the restriction of protest activities to 
minimize community disruption.  
Another research question in this study is designed to assess differences between 
agencies with high and low model policy compliance. However, given the relatively small 
sample used in this study, it may be useful to provide context around those agencies with the 
highest and those with the lowest compliance scores. Only one of the 117 sample agencies 
complies with all 45 IACP model policy recommendations. Interestingly, this agency has a 
history of protest violence and other violent crowd events (e.g. sporting event riots). These past 
events might have served as the impetus for the police agency to adopt best practice protest 
management techniques promoted by the IACP. This agency faced the challenge of shifting 
community perceptions of the agency, and media reports indicate that the agency aimed to 
reduce police use of force while managing crowds. The Chief of this department, as cited in a 
2015 news article, stated that the agency’s use of new protest management tactics resulted from 
the agency’s adoption of constitutional policing.  
 Constitutional policing is derived from Law Enforcement Misconduct Statute § 14141, 
which states that police shall behave in a lawful manner without infringing upon individual 
constitutional rights (United States Department of Justice, 2017). Fyfe (2004) contends that this 
statute holds officers accountable for their decisions and ensures that officers behave in an 
appropriate manner. This strategy is heavily linked with constitutional issues relating to search 
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and seizures (Fyfe, 2004; Rushin & Edwards, 2017). However, the focus of this strategy extends 
beyond this issue into other policing activities, including the management of crowds and 
protests.    
 As stated previously, in policing, there has been a recent emphasis on preserving 
constitutional rights during protests. The adoption of constitutional policing has emerged in 
many agencies for protest management, including the agency that has the greatest level of 
compliance with IACP recommendations. Protecting individual rights during violent protests can 
prove quite difficult. The challenge becomes safeguarding law-abiding participant rights, while 
ensuring the safety of officers and society as a whole. While some see police use of force during 
protests as an inherent violation of constitutional rights, there are times that force is necessary to 
ensure the protection of both the public and police.  
 The high-profile nature of controversial use of force incidents has led many agencies to 
adopt constitutional policing as part of their overall mission. One primary impetus, the shooting 
of Michael Brown by a Ferguson police officer in August 2014, triggered an investigation into 
Ferguson Police Department’s practices (Dukanovic, 2016). The Department of Justice (DOJ) 
released a report of their findings in a document commonly referred to as The Ferguson Report. 
This report highlighted the need for police agencies to embrace fair and impartial practices. 
Findings suggested a history of police conduct that disproportionately targeted black community 
residents (United States Department of Justice, 2015). According to this report, black residents 
accounted for 67% of Ferguson’s population, but they were subject to 93% of arrests from 2012 
to 2014. The DOJ suggested that this outcome was at least partially the result of police 
prioritizing revenue generation through citations, instead of public safety.  
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 Many researchers have also examined perceived discriminatory practices when assessing 
protest management and outcomes. Police are not solely blamed for perceived discriminatory 
practices during protests. For example, research suggests that the media inaccurately portrays 
black demonstrators as being more violent than others (Rickford, 2016). This research, along 
with others highlighted in the current study, including the Ferguson Report, seems to have 
served as catalysts in the adoption of constitutional policing nationwide.  
 The agency with the second highest model policy compliance score adopted 43 of the 45 
practices recommended by the IACP. The two tactics that were not adopted by this agency were 
the provisions to use batons and barricades/police lines for spatial containment. Interestingly, 
both of these tactics align with command and control strategies. There were multiple similarities 
between the agency with a perfect IACP model policy compliance score and this agency. For 
instance, both agencies were above the median for the percentage of officers with bachelor’s 
degrees. Additionally, these agencies served poorer jurisdictions, housing more residents below 
the poverty line. Finally, both agencies authorized all of their officers to employ leg-hobbling 
techniques. This last finding deserves further examination. It may be that agencies who are likely 
to face numerous violent protests are more likely to adopt best practices, which explains the high 
degree of compliance, as well as providing officers a wide-range of options for dealing with 
violent offenders, including permitting various forms of restraint. 
 In contrast to those with the highest compliance scores, two agency policies do not 
adhere to any of the practices advocated by the IACP model policy. These low-scoring agencies 
also share interesting similarities. Both of these agencies employ fewer officers with bachelor’s 
degrees and typically serve populations housing residents above the poverty line. Additionally, 
neither of these agencies authorize officers to use leg-hobbling techniques. Interestingly, these 
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agency characteristics are completely divergent from the characteristics of the two agencies with 
the highest level of model policy compliance. This may indicate that each of these variables 
(officer education, jurisdictional poverty level, and use of specific restraints) have important 
implications for adoption of best practices in protest management. This represents a potential 
avenue for future research.  
 One agency with a protest management policy that does not adhere to any of the IACP 
model policy recommendations presents an especially unique case. Of interest is this agency’s 
geographic proximity to a location that experienced a significant incident of civil unrest. Given 
the high-profile protests that occurred in this area, the lack of compliance with the IACP model 
policy is noteworthy. One distinctive difference between agencies with higher compliance scores 
and this agency is the adoption of body-worn cameras (BWC’s). Both of the agencies with the 
highest compliance scores have utilized BWC’s for a number of years. The agency that 
experienced significant civil unrest and does not comply with any of IACP recommended tactics 
measured in this study, has not adopted this technology. According to recent news articles, the 
jurisdiction’s council recently voted to require BWCs for all officers in mid-2019. Media reports 
suggest that the delay in implementing this technology was due to the vast data storage costs 
associated with BWCs.  
 BWCs have become increasingly popular within recent years due to calls for increased 
transparency and accountability of police practices (Smykla, Crow, Crichlow, & Snyder, 2016; 
Taylor, 2016). While adoption of BWCs has increased, researchers and others continue to call 
attention to privacy and surveillance concerns (Simmons, 2014; Sousa, Miethe, & Sakiyama, 
2017). Still, some research shows that use of force incidents decrease significantly when officers 
are required to wear BWCs (e.g., Ariel, Farrar, & Sutherland, 2015). To date, the impact of BWC 
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adoption on police policy changes has not been studied. As such, the adoption (or failure to 
adopt) BWC technology may help us to understand why and when shifts in protest policies 
occur. This also represents a future avenue for policy- and protest-related research.   
2. To what degree do agency policies align with theoretically-based strategy themes (i.e., 
negotiated management, command and control, and escalated force) identified within 
the IACP model policy? 
 In addition to measuring agency policy degree of compliance with the IACP model 
policy on crowd management and control, this study also examines the degree of alignment with 
three specific protest management strategies. The sample agency policies vary greatly, and 
current findings indicate that agencies typically adopt practices stemming from each of the 
protest management strategies, rather than aligning with one specific strategy. The following 
sections discuss agency alignment with each of these strategies in detail.  
Alignment with Negotiated Management 
 On average, agencies align with about one-third (33.3%) of the tactics representing the 
use of negotiated management. This strategy promotes tactics focused on planning for lawful 
assemblies and the use of police-protestor dialog to problem solve during demonstrations. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the most commonly adopted negotiated management tactics 
include using the ICS/NIMS protocol for planning (79.5%), requiring verbal warnings before 
resorting to physical dispersal tactics (53.9%), providing contingencies for additional personnel 
(51.3%), requiring a neutral demeanor for officers (48.7%), and providing directives for 
spontaneous civil disturbances (48.7%). Agencies within this sample with high levels of 
negotiated management alignment place importance on planning for lawful assemblies and 
promoting dialog in order to effectively manage protests and avoid use of force incidents. 
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According to the negotiated management approach, the ultimate goal is avoidance of use of force 
(King, 2013). However, training in this approach requires police to know how to appropriately 
identify the contexts in which dialog will be effective and when use of force is necessary 
(Gorringe, Stott, & Rosie, 2012).  
 There are three agency crowd management policies that align with all 15 items used to 
measure compliance with the negotiated management strategy. Since these items were drawn 
from the same instrument that measured compliance with the IACP model policy, it is 
unsurprising that two of these agencies are also the agencies with the highest degree of model 
policy compliance. The three agencies with perfect negotiated management compliance all 
employ officers with higher educational attainment and authorize all of their sworn personnel to 
employ chemical agents. The agency with perfect negotiated management compliance but not 
one of the top two with regard to IACP model compliance (i.e., scoring 33 out of 45) is also 
unique in its own way. This agency serves a well-educated jurisdiction and has a well-educated 
police force, with 98% of residents graduating high school and about one-quarter of officers 
holding higher education degrees. However, neither the jurisdiction nor the agency is very 
diverse, reporting populations of 1.8% non-white residents and 1.8% non-white officers. While 
there is little diversity within the police department, it can be said that the agency is truly 
representative of its population.  
 Conversely, there are 12 agencies with policies that do not contain any of the measured 
negotiated management tactics. Half of these agencies employ officers with lower educational 
attainment and do not authorize officers to utilize chemical agents. These findings indicate that 
education and permission to use chemical agents may be important in understanding negotiated 
management strategy adoption among agencies. Nine of the 12 agencies that do not require 
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negotiated management tactics to manage protests employ fewer minority officers than are 
constituted within the community, thus leading to a sense of underrepresentation within these 
agencies. This finding may imply that agencies that better reflect the populations they serve may 
also be more likely to adopt negotiated management practices.  
Alignment with Command and Control  
 In general, agency policy alignment is lower for command and control tactics than 
negotiated management. On average, agencies align with about one-quarter (26.7%) of the 15 
measured command and control tactics. These tactics focus on the restriction of time, place, and 
manner of protest activities. As discussed in the previous chapter, the more frequently adopted 
command and control tactics are implementing specialized units for crowd dispersal (62.4%), 
required perimeters for civil disturbances (58.1%), temporary detention areas following mass 
arrest (43.6%), prohibiting canines for crowd control (27.4%), and restricting bystanders from 
entering disturbance areas (23.9%). Most command and control tactics relate to the use of spatial 
containment to prevent additional participants from entering disturbance areas and removing 
problematic individuals to stop further crowd incitement. The central aim of this strategy is to 
prevent protests from disrupting routine activities in the community (Vitale, 2005).  
 There are two agencies with policies that aligned with 14 of 15 possible command and 
control tactics. Both agencies had more specialized units than the average agency (median = 7 
specialized units). Having more specialized units aligns with the command and control model, as 
this strategy advocates for specialized training to manage protest crowds (Vitale, 2005). 
Additionally, both of these agencies authorize all of their officers to use chemical agents, soft 
projectiles, and impact weapons. These types of police use of force options also support the basic 
tenets of command and control. These weapons are often used in conjunction with spatial 
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containment techniques (Schweingruber, 2000; Vitale, 2005). Finally, both of these agencies 
utilize information from community surveys and provide in-depth training for new recruits on 
community-oriented policing. One agency policy does not contain any tactics that align with the 
command and control strategy. Unlike the two agencies with the highest command and control 
alignment, this agency has fewer specialized units than the median; officers are not authorized to 
use chemical agents, soft projectiles, or impact weapons; the agency does not use community 
surveys for input; and community-oriented policing training is not provided for new recruits.  
Alignment with Escalated Force 
 Agency policies are most aligned with the escalated force strategy. On average, agencies 
within this sample aligned with about half (53.3%) of the 15 measured escalated force tactics. 
Escalated force strategies rely on the use of force to disperse disorderly crowds (McPhail, 
Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Schweingruber, 2000). The most commonly adopted 
escalated force tactics within the sample agencies are restricting tear gas to appropriate situations 
(79.5%), prohibiting Tasers for restraint purposes (66.7%), using aerosol spray only against those 
engaging in unlawful behaviors (64.1%), allowing mass arrest during civil disturbances (56.4%), 
and requiring arrest for those engaging in unlawful behavior (53.9%). Escalated force strategies 
typically promote the use of less-lethal weapons and arrest to ensure crowd compliance 
(McPhail, Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Schweingruber, 2000). 
 Two agencies have policies that align with 13 of 15 escalated force tactics. These two 
agencies are both below the median for number of sworn personnel (median = 376). Both 
agencies also have fewer specialized units than the average agency and provide extensive 
community-oriented policing training to recruits in the academy. Additionally, both agencies 
have percentages of minority (median = 16.86) and black officers (median = 7.76) that are above 
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the median. Finally, the two agencies with the greatest degree of escalated force alignment also 
authorize all officers to use soft projectiles and impact weapons. Conversely, the single agency 
with the lowest level of escalated force alignment (i.e., 3 of 15 tactics) is above the median for 
number of sworn officers and number of specialized units, but below the median for percentage 
of minority and black officers. Additionally, this agency does not authorize all officers to use 
soft projectiles, impact weapons, or provide community-oriented policing training to new 
recruits. These findings suggest that differences in agency-level characteristics may be helpful in 
explaining why escalated force tactics are (or are not) adopted.     
3. Are agency- and jurisdiction-level characteristics associated with overall degree of 
compliance and reliance on strategy themes within the IACP model policy? 
While examining differences between agencies with the highest and lowest 
compliance/alignment scores provides cursory insight into why agencies might adopt different 
practices, the data in this study are also subjected to linear regression models to assess the 
relationship between agency- and jurisdiction-level characteristics with the adoption of model 
policy and strategy-specific tactics. The findings from the bivariate correlations and regression 
models are presented in the findings section, but are now discussed in terms of three themes: 
community-oriented policing, strict enforcement and use of force, and regional differences in 
practices.  
Community-Oriented Policing 
 This study examines the correlation between various community-oriented policing 
variables and the degree of compliance with the IACP model policy, as well as the level of 
alignment with the three existing protest management strategies. Variables in these models 
include the educational attainment and level of diversity within an agency, as well as the extent 
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to which agencies adopt and train recruits/officers in the use of community-oriented practices. 
The findings from this study indicate that there is a relationship between community-oriented 
policing and multiple protest management strategies employed in the United States. Agencies 
employing more black (r = .225, p < .05) and minority (r = .225, p < .05) officers are more likely 
to adopt command and control tactics. Those agencies with more minority officers (r = .188, p < 
.05) are also more likely to employ tactics advocated by the IACP. Additionally, agencies with 
higher educational attainment (r = .229, p < .05) are more likely to align with negotiated 
management tactics. Finally, agencies that utilize information from community surveys are more 
likely to comply with the IACP model policy (r = .162, p < .10), as well as align with negotiated 
management practices (r = .158, p < .10) and command and control tactics (r = .205, p < .05). 
Regression models indicate that agencies with more educated officers (B = .311, p < .05), serving 
populations with higher educational attainment (B = .189, p < .10) are more likely to adopt 
negotiated management tactics. The model testing the community-oriented policing training and 
practice on the adoption of negotiated management tactics is not significant and does not reveal 
any significant correlations.  
 While previous research attributes community-oriented policing to the development of 
negotiated management tactics, this study finds mixed results. The variables used to represent 
training of new recruits and current officers in community-oriented policing were not related to 
the use of negotiated management tactics. This result was the same for variables representing the 
adoption of community-oriented practices. However, these are not the only measures of 
community policing in this study. Diversity, community involvement, and education seem to be 
related to the use of negotiated management. Additionally, diversity and community involvement 
are also related to the command and control strategy.  
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 Since the 1990’s, community-oriented policing has been one of the most widely adopted 
U.S. policing strategies. Advocates of this approach contend that there are specific factors that 
necessitate the success of community policing. For example, employing a diverse population is 
advantageous to those agencies adopting community-oriented policing, as officers are able to 
better represent the populations that they serve (Cordner & Scarborough, 1997). Recent studies 
provide inconclusive results on the impact of agency diversity on both use of force (Alpert, 
Dunham, & Mcdonald, 2004; Shjarback. Decker, Rojek, & Brunson, 2017; Todak, Huff & 
James, 2018) and perceived police legitimacy (Ozkan, Worrall, & Piquero, 2016; Todak, Huff, & 
James, 2018). However, diversifying agencies is advocated by many proponents of community 
policing as a way to identify with and facilitate change in the community (Peak & Sousa, 2018). 
This study indicates that agencies with more diversity are more likely to adopt practices 
recommended by the IACP, which as mentioned previously, is largely related to providing 
guidance on the use of force during protests. Additionally, the more diverse an agency, the more 
likely they are to align with command and control strategies. This finding indicates that the level 
of diversity within an agency may be more correlated with the adoption of restrictive practices, 
than was previously realized.  
 One of the most commonly emphasized aspects of community policing is the necessity 
for the community to participate in order maintenance. The father of metropolitan policing, Sir 
Robert Peel, stated that police could not effectively manage their jurisdictions without the 
support of the public (Emsley, 2013). Trajanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990) reinforced this point, 
when introducing community-oriented policing, asserting that the community must play a role in 
policy-making decisions with the police. This argument is partially supported by findings in this 
dissertation, which designate that agencies utilizing community input are more likely to comply 
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with the IACP model policy (r = .162, p < .10), while also adopting negotiated management (r = 
.158, p < .10) tactics. However, agencies utilizing community input are also more likely to adopt 
command and control practices (r = .205, p < .05). 
Along with diversifying and employing community input, advocates find the role of 
higher education to be advantageous for agencies to promote community-oriented policing (Peak 
& Sousa, 2018). College educated officers have been praised for being more understanding of 
human behavior and more aware of community issues (Carlan & Byxbe, 2000). Additionally, 
those officers with higher educational attainment have been found to rely on force less often 
(Oliva, Morgan, & Compton, 2010). Previous research accentuates the necessity for education 
within policing. However, while research suggests that educating police, at least partially, 
improves community relations (Carlan & Byxbe, 2000), the education of the public is rarely 
discussed.  
Negotiated management thrives when there are successful relationships built between 
police and protest organizers (King, 2013). This study finds that agencies that have more highly 
educated officers (B = .311, p < .05) and serve more educated populations (B = .189, p < .10) are 
more likely to adopt negotiated management tactics. This finding implies that the adoption of 
negotiated management tactics may be correlated with the education of both police and 
community residents. Future research should further examine this relationship. 
Finally, while the use of community-oriented policing has been associated with the use of 
negotiated management tactics, this dissertation finds that there is also a relationship between 
community-oriented policing and command and control practices. Kelling (2019) contends that 
community-oriented policing is sometimes portrayed as a soft approach to crime. However, 
community-policing strategies are tailored to community concerns and can involve aggressive 
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crime control tactics. This argument aligns with the findings produced within this dissertation. 
Agency use of community-oriented policing tactics is correlated with use of command and 
control tactics, which are defined by the use of restrictive measures for protest management. As 
such, this dissertation expands upon previous research by revealing an association between 
community-oriented policing and multiple protest management strategies, beyond negotiated 
management. 
Strict Enforcement and Use of Force 
 The current dissertation highlights the effect of jurisdiction-level characteristics on the 
adoption of command and control tactics. While this study examines the relationship between 
both agency- and jurisdiction-level variables and multiple crowd management strategies, 
jurisdictional characteristics are found to be related to only the command and control model. 
Command and control tactics are primarily employed to minimize community disruption (Vitale, 
2005). As such, when an agency serves larger populations that may be seen as threatening to the 
greater society, they may be more likely to adopt restrictive tactics for protest crowds. The 
current study finds that those agencies serving larger populations (r = .196, p < .05) are more 
likely to adopt command and control tactics. Additionally, agencies serving larger black 
populations (r = .221, p < .05) are also more likely to align with command and control tactics. 
Those agencies policing areas with higher violent crime (r = .194, p < .05) and unemployment 
rates (.155, p < .10) tend to adopt command and control tactics more often, as well. Regression 
models reveal that larger agencies (B = .230, p < .10) serving larger populations (B = .185, p < 
.10) typically align with command and control strategies.  
 LeGrande (1967) historically stated that the most widely accepted police strategy in the 
United States is a strict enforcement policy, where all parties are treated equally under the law. 
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However, Harcourt (1998; 2001) suggests that this is not the case and strict enforcement 
strategies lead to perceived discriminatory practices that unfairly affect minorities and the lower 
class. These populations are often equated with disruptive behavior (Harcourt, 1998; 2001). The 
current study’s findings reveal that areas with greater levels of disorganization and more 
minorities– higher violent crime rate, higher unemployment rate, larger population, and larger 
Black populations – tend to align with the use of restrictive protest management strategies. 
Communities with larger Black populations tend to have more negative perceptions of police 
(Peck, 2015), thus creating more tension during interactions. However, while the social 
disorganization literature stresses the influence of poverty, findings from this analysis indicate 
that poverty levels are not associated with more restrictive policing tactics. While poverty levels 
are often included in social disorganization studies, some research suggests that income 
inequality may be a better representation of this concept (Kawachi et al., 1999). Income 
inequality leads to feelings of perceived deprivation (Runcimann, 1966), which in turn can result 
in disorderly behavior, or in extreme cases, violence (Piven & Cloward, 2012). As such, it is 
possible that the adoption of command and control tactics is correlated with income inequality, 
rather than general poverty levels. Overall, as police struggle to manage these types of social 
issues – violent crime, unemployment, larger populations, and negative community relations – 
their approach to crowd management may be to adopt more restrictive measures.  
 While areas with more disorganization and larger Black populations are more likely to 
use command and control tactics, areas with more black community residents are also more 
likely to experience the use of escalated tactics. Previous research suggests that racially 
motivated protests are more likely to be violent and that black demonstrators hold higher 
propensities for violence, due to the lack of legitimate opportunity to affect social change 
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(Davenport et al., 2011; Eisinger, 1973; Isaac et al., 1980; Nilson & Nilson, 1980). Rickford 
(2016) asserts that Black Lives Matter protests may not be as violent as the media portrays. 
However, the media’s portrayal of this movement as violent may lead police to adopt more 
restrictive practices and employ guidance on use of force tactics as a contingency for these types 
of demonstrations. While this study finds that areas with larger black populations align with 
escalated force strategies, it does not necessarily mean that police are using more force against 
protestors in these areas.  From the current findings, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that 
agencies in these areas are more likely to include plans for use of force, should force prove 
necessary.  
Regional Differences 
 Previous research finds regional differences in protests, namely that some regions are 
more likely to experience violent protest outcomes than others (Davenport et al., 2011; Eisinger, 
1973). As such, one might expect police policies governing protests to also vary by region. This 
study finds regional variation in the policies implemented for protest management. Northeastern 
agencies are less likely to align with the IACP model policy and negotiated management 
strategies. Western agencies are more likely to adopt practices recommended by the IACP and 
less likely to adopt escalated force tactics. Western police agencies may be more likely to adopt 
best practices due to the methods used to construct their policies. For example, approximately 
95% of police agencies in California rely on private corporations (i.e., Lexipol) to create their 
policies (Eagly & Schwartz, 2018). According to Reaves (2011), there are over 500 agencies in 
California alone, which accounts for a large portion of agencies in the Western United States. 
Agency policies in the West reveal greater alignment with the IACP model policy – adoption of 
planning and dialog, limited use of restriction, and guidance on use of force. The higher 
 106 
compliance scores on the IACP scale for Western U.S. agencies may be due to the use of 
privatized corporations for policy construction in this region of the United States,  
 Finally, Southern agencies are more likely to adopt escalated force tactics.  
 The Southern United States has a history of racial hostility, that has repeatedly resulted in 
violence (Blee, 2005). As such, some may suggest that racism can explain the finding that 
Southern agencies are more likely to adopt escalated force tactics. However, this study does not 
include measures of police bias or racism. Conclusions concerning the association between the 
use of escalated force and police bias cannot be drawn from the current analyses and further 
research is warranted. As previously mentioned, this study finds that escalated force tactics are 
most prominent in areas with larger black populations. The 2010 U.S. Census revealed that the 
highest concentration of black Americans was in the Southern United States (Rastogi, Johnson, 
Hoeffel, & Drewery, 2011). As such, the finding that the Southern United States is also more 
likely to adopt these tactics is not surprising. Isaac and colleagues (1980) suggest members of the 
black community may have higher propensities for violence during protests. Previous research 
contends that this population relies on violence to enact social change due to a lack of legitimate 
opportunity to voice their opinion in alternate arenas (e.g., criminal justice system, political 
system, etc.) (Isaac et al., 1980; Piven & Cloward, 2012). This finding coupled with the fact that 
police may perceive Black groups to be more threatening (Davenport et al., 2011) can help to 
explain why escalated force crowd management strategies are more likely to be adopted by 
Southern police agencies. 
 While it appears that place matters, region alone cannot explain all, or even most, of the 
observed agency policy differences. Future research might examine interaction effects between 
region and other agency/jurisdiction-level variables to further explore why some agencies are 
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more likely to adopt best practices. Further, examining these interactions might provide 
additional insight into why particular agencies embrace particular types of crowd management 
strategies.   
Current Study: Strengths and Limitations 
 The primary contribution of the present study is that this research represents the first 
attempt to examine current U.S. police agency protest management policies. Historically, police 
protest management strategies have only been discussed theoretically. Previous research has 
identified the basic elements of specific strategies (Bourne, 2011; King, 2013; McPhail, 
Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Schweingruber, 2000) and provided case studies about the 
use of specific strategy tactics for single events (Gillham & Noakes, 2007; King, 2013; Vitale, 
2005). To date, there have been no empirical examinations of police practices in the United 
States to manage protest crowds. This study provides the first empirical assessment of U.S. 
police protest management strategies. It offers insight into variation among agency policies, the 
degree to which they align with best practice standards, and agency adoption of particular protest 
management strategies.  
 Previous literature highlights the correlation between protest violence and police presence 
(Davenport et al., 2011; Earl et al., 2003; Eisinger, 1973). However, no empirical studies have 
examined the mediating effect of protest management strategies on protest violence. This 
dissertation provides evidence that police policies differ dramatically across agencies. The 
differences documented in the current analysis can be used to guide future observational studies 
and empirical research on police protest management and protest crowd behavior.  
 While the first of its kind, there are several limitations to this exploratory study. First, the 
sample of police agencies included in this study is relatively small. Power calculations indicate 
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that a random sample of 267 agencies is needed to generate appropriate power levels to identify 
true agency differences and appropriately generalize findings to all U.S. police agencies. As 
such, the sample within this study (n = 117), while stratified to obtain a comprehensive cross 
section of different sized agencies across various regions of the country, did not produce findings 
generalizable to all police agencies in the United States. However, these initial findings still 
demonstrate the vast differences among U.S. police protest management policies and hold 
potential to guide future protest management studies in the United States.  
 Second, this study offers a content analysis of police policies. Qualitative methods, 
especially content analyses, are often criticized for the subjectivity associated with their 
interpretation (Patton, 2015). The policy content examined in this study is documented using 
dichotomous measures, which constrains interpretation by limiting potential responses. Still, 
some subjectivity is introduced with any coding procedure. This study attempts to control for this 
limitation by using independent coders to measure the degree of interrater reliability. Two coders 
examined police policies and indicated whether or not particular crowd management tactics were 
present in each agency’s policies. Initial analysis revealed an interrater reliability score of .866. 
McHugh (2012) contends that .800 is the minimum acceptable standard to ensure coding 
reliability. For policies where coder discrepancies existed, a neutral-third party was asked to 
recode the answers based on their interpretation of the policy. This coding was then included as 
the final value for the data.  
 Third, many of the variables in this study (i.e., use of force, community policing) are 
measured dichotomously, restricting variation within the data. These variables represent complex 
concepts and interactions that may not be appropriately captured using binary attributes. 
Research employing more robust measures may produce different findings.   
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 Fourth, this study only includes police agencies serving populations of over 25,000. 
Those agencies serving smaller populations are not represented within this sample, thus no 
conclusions can be drawn concerning agency policies in smaller jurisdictions. Future research 
may include agencies of all sizes. Since protests generally occur in urban areas, smaller agencies 
may not have policies governing these activities. Still, further evaluation is needed to explore 
whether this hypothesis is accurate and determine, if policies exist, the degree to which these 
policies differ from those of larger agencies. 
 Fifth, recent studies have introduced an additional protest management strategy, strategic 
incapacitation, discussed within the literature as an alternative to negotiated management 
(Gillham, 2011; Gillham, Edwards, & Noakes, 2013; Gillham & Noakes, 2007). However, this 
strategy integrates specific tenets that define other strategies (e.g., use of force, spatial 
containment). The measures used in this study were not developed to directly measure agency 
adoption of strategic incapacitation tactics. As such, this dissertation does not provide insight 
into the degree to which policies reflect this integrated strategy. 
Sixth, the items created to code specific protest management strategies within the model 
policy are presented in a manner that suggests that each item aligns with only one management 
strategy (i.e., negotiated management, command and control, or escalated force). However, 
single items may be interpreted as representative of multiple strategies. For instance, the reverse-
coded item, “Does the policy require officers to maintain a courteous demeanor during the 
event,” was created to measure alignment with escalated force. However, this item, if not reverse 
coded is symbolic of negotiated management. The items created are this author’s subjective 
interpretations of tactics that represent existing protest strategies. This is the first attempt to 
identify specific tactics, outlined in policy, that represent each strategy. Future research may 
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employ a different coding scheme or identify different tactics that align with each strategy and, 
thus, produce different findings.  
Seventh, agency compliance and alignment scores could be biased for specific items. For 
example, those questions pertaining to canine or other specialized units may have generated 
misleading results. For example, agencies that do not provide restrictions for canine units are 
coded as not aligning with IACP recommended practices. However, this study does not control 
for whether agencies currently employ canine units. Additionally, to adopt use of force policies 
governing various force methods (i.e., impact weapons, impact projectiles, Tasers, chemical 
agents, aerosol restraint spray), officers would first need authorization to employ the various 
methods of force outlined in the IACP model policy. As such, it is important to note that the 
current findings may be biased against smaller agencies that do not have the type of structure 
assumed by the IACP model policy.  
Finally, while all policies collected for this study contain dates that suggest the policies 
were written or revised after August 2014 (i.e., following the events of Ferguson), this study did 
not control for when the policy was initially constructed. Many agencies require that their 
policies be regularly inspected or revised (e.g., every six months or every year). However, the 
revision dates may or may not reflect significant changes made to the policy, as there is no 
document assessing the differences between original and revised policies. Therefore, it is not 
possible to examine if or how policies have changed over time or following significant events, 
like the unrest in Ferguson.  
Implications 
 Policy implications. This research highlights the frequency in which various tactics, 
including guidance on the use of force, are included in police protest management policies. 
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Recent emphasis on the appropriate use of police force, including escalated force tactics, stems 
from a number of controversial use of force incidents within recent years. The media has widely 
covered contentious and violent police-protestor interactions (Rickford, 2016), affecting public 
perceptions of police (Donovan & Klahm, 2015; Lawrence, 2000). This study’s findings 
document the use of specific tactics within U.S. police policies that promote or restrict particular 
police behaviors. It highlights the diversity of policy content and the degree to which current 
policies reflect, or fail to reflect, best practice standards promoted by one of the largest national 
police organizations – specifically the International Association of Chiefs of Police. The 
relatively low degree of overall organization-level compliance with the IACP model policy 
offers important insight for those looking to improve police practices. This finding also leads to 
two important questions. First, what factors encourage (or allow) police agencies to align their 
policies with national-level standards? Although the current study begins to explore this 
question, much more work is needed to identify the contexts in which agencies are most likely to 
adopt national standards. Second, does adopting best practice standards improve protest 
outcomes? Again, this question cannot be answered without further investigation.  
 This study finds that only about one-third of 15 examined negotiated management tactics 
are present in the average U.S. police agency protest management policy. Yet, international 
research suggests that negotiated management techniques help police to reduce protest violence. 
For example, dialog policing is hailed as one of the most popular and successful protest 
management strategies used to prevent protest violence in other countries (Gorringe, Stott, & 
Rosie, 2012). This strategy has been adopted in several countries, including Sweden, Canada, 
and the United Kingdom. The popularity of dialog policing in Western countries has led to an 
emergence of dialog-based approaches in the United States, including the use of related 
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negotiated management tactics. There is some evidence to suggest that negotiated management, 
and other communication-focused strategies, can be effective at preventing protest violence 
(Baker, 2008; Gillham & Noakes, 2007). This study suggests that there is room to increase and 
improve our use of negotiated management tactics through policy revisions. The adoption of this 
strategy encourages police to engage in impactful negotiation with protest organizers throughout 
the demonstration process and could potentially reduce violent protest incidents that occur due to 
preventable negative police-protestor interactions.  
 Finally, this study offers insight for professional organizations that construct and 
distribute model policies. The analyses reveal that most agencies policies have a low level of 
alignment with the tactics promoted by the best practice model policy used in this study. 
Professional organizations, in this case IACP, may want to attempt to determine why agencies 
are not aligning their policies with the proposed model. However, it may be the case that these 
model policies prove most helpful for agencies in turmoil. One interesting finding from this 
study is the agency that aligns perfectly with practices advocated by the IACP has a history of 
crowd violence at protests. As such, the model policies provided by professional organizations 
may influence agencies who are pressured alter their protest management practices in times of 
crisis, but do not greatly affect agencies that are not facing professional or public scrutiny.  
Directions for future research. This study’s findings and limitations offer considerable 
guidance for future research. First, future research may examine the impact of additional agency- 
and jurisdiction-level characteristics on the adoption of particular police policies. As mentioned 
previously, the variables in this study are largely dichotomous, so future studies with more robust 
measures may provide greater insight into the factors that impact the adoption of best practices 
or certain protest management strategies. While the overall statistical models within this study do 
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not reach significance levels, future research may identify other characteristics that help to 
explain policy content. Other variables that would likely influence policy, like numbers of 
jurisdictional protests or the level of crowd management training provided to officers, are beyond 
the scope of the current study.  
 Both quantitative and qualitative assessments of the impact of agency policy on police 
officer behavior would greatly benefit both theory and practice. This study assumes that agency 
policy drives officer behavior, but this cannot be confirmed without further investigation. 
Differences between policy and practice, if any exist, have important implications for protest 
management. This type of investigation can also highlight critical areas in which police 
administrators can improve officer training to better affect protest outcomes. 
 Finally, future research might examine the timing of the tactics adopted for protest 
management. The “Ferguson Effect” hypothesized that negative perceptions of police in the 
United States, following the events in Ferguson, caused violent crime rates to increase. Some 
research suggests that this effect is purely anecdotal and is not supported by data (Pyrooz, 
Decker, Wolfe, & Shjarback, 2016). However, Wolfe & Nix (2016) state that other areas of 
policing may be experiencing a Ferguson Effect. This begs the question, “Did the events of 
Ferguson lead agencies to alter their protest management practices?” If possible, future research 
should examine the timing of policy changes within U.S. police agencies to determine whether 
such changes have occurred, or are more likely to occur following high-profile incidents.   
Final Thoughts 
 This study represents a first attempt at documenting the diversity and types of strategies 
used by U.S. police agencies to manage protest crowds and activities. While the impact of police 
presence on protests was explored several decades ago (Eisinger, 1973), little additional 
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empirical research has been conducted. Most extant literature provides theoretical contexts for 
classifying and understanding the impact that specific policing strategies have had on protests in 
Western democracies (e.g., see Della Porta & Reiter, 1998). Protest scholars note that escalated 
force strategies were developed and used during the 1960’s and 1970’s (McPhail, 
Schweingruber, & McCarthy, 1998; Schweingruber, 2000), command and control during the 
1980’s (Bourne, 2011; Vitale, 2005), and negotiated management from the 1990’s to present 
(Gillham & Noakes, 2007; King, 2013; Vitale, 2005).  
 This study examined police policies pertaining to protest management to assess the 
degree of compliance with the IACP’s model policy on crowd management and control, as well 
as alignment with existing protest management strategies. Additionally, agency- and jurisdiction-
level characteristics were examined to determine if specific factors are associated with agency 
adoption of best practices or specific types of crowd management strategies. Both qualitative and 
quantitative methods were used to identify specific tactics within the IACP model policy and 
build an instrument to measure agency compliance with this policy, as well as alignment with 
specific management strategies. The findings of this study indicate that there is a large degree of 
variation in the types of tactics found within U.S. police protest management policies. Although 
the three major strategies examined in this study are typically discussed as fitting neatly into 
historical eras, U.S. police agencies currently permit and require the use of tactics that align with 
all three of these strategies. As such, this study suggests that agencies have not replaced one 
specific strategy with another, rather, police manage protests using a variety of tactics developed 
over time to address the complexities of modern-day protest management. While negotiated 
management tactics help police to engage with protest organizers and plan for events, command 
and control tactics are useful for addressing disorderly crowds and escalated force tactics may be 
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needed to address protestors who engage in violence or management protests that evolve into 
civil disturbances.  
 This study provides insight into the types of tactics employed by police in the United 
States to manage protest crowds. While previous literature provides theoretical frameworks that 
explain the development and purpose of various strategies, this is the first study to empirically 
assess the degree to which these tactics are incorporated into police policies. As such, this 
dissertation provides a preliminary framework to further evaluate protest management policies 
and the impact of police strategies on the occurrence of protest violence.   
The impact of police policy and practice on protest outcomes remains a worthy and 
mostly unexplored research topic. While protest violence is a rare occurrence (Davenport et al., 
2011), the consequences associated with it can prove quite disastrous for participants and the 
surrounding community. As such, it is essential that future research continue to explore the 
impact of specific agency policies on police practice and protest outcomes. 
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APPENDIX A 
Protest Strategy Information Table 
 
Table 19: Protest Strategy Information Table 
Protest Management 
Strategy 
Time Frame 
(According to 
Literature) 
Theoretical Basis Central Tenets 
Escalated Force 1960’s and 1970’s Le Bon’s Contagion 
Theory 
1. Ignore First Amendment Rights 
2. No tolerance for community disruption 
3. No communication with protesters 
4. Mass Arrest 
5. Indiscriminate use of force 
Command and 
Control 
1980’s Strict Enforcement 1. Minimal community disruption 
2. Controlled access 
3. Divide and conquer protesters 
4. “Shock and awe” distribution of officers 
5. Zero tolerance policing 
Negotiated 
Management 
1990’s to present Community-Oriented 
Policing 
1. Trust between police and protesters 
2. Transparency in discretionary process 
3. Dialog between police and protesters 
Strategic 
Incapacitation 
2000’s to Present Elaborated Social 
Identity Model 
1. Focused component of use of force 
2. Focused component of arrest 
3. Perceived legitimacy of police action 
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APPENDIX B 
Protest Strategy Instrument Items and Justifications 
Negotiated Management Coding Items 
 
 
Protest Instrument Item IACP 
Reference 
Rationale for Inclusion 
1. Does the policy prioritize the 
protection of First Amendment 
rights? 
II. Policy 
 
Negotiated management strategies perceive protest crowds as exercising First 
Amendment rights, whereas other strategies view them as disorderly and 
destructive. This item examines whether agencies prioritize the facilitation of 
constitutional rights, as well as safety and security.   
2. Does the policy utilize the 
Incident Command System or 
National Incident Management 
System protocol for crowd 
management? 
A3 
 
Negotiated management strategies emphasize the use of planning and organization 
for demonstrations. By utilizing the ICS or NIMS protocol, agencies emphasize 
the importance of organization during these types of events.  
3. Does the policy require that 
protests be photographed and/or 
video recorded? 
A7 
 
As negotiated management strategies are built upon trust and coordination 
between police and demonstrators, utilizing video and photographs accentuates the 
transparency of the tactics police employ. Transparency is essential for trust and 
cooperation.  
4. Does the policy require 
supervisory approval before an 
officer can make an arrest? 
B1 
 
Negotiated management strategies call for arrest to be used as a last resort. By 
stipulating that arrests must be approved by supervisors, agencies are ensuring that 
they are truly justified in using this tactic.  
5. Does the policy require a 
supervisor to submit a written 
action plan for demonstrations? 
D1 
 
Negotiated management strategies emphasize pre-planning for demonstrations. 
Requiring a written action plan by a supervisor promotes advance consideration of 
potential risks and police response to those risks.  
6. Does the policy require an 
effort to contact protest 
organizers before the event? 
D2 
 
Negotiated management strategies promote trust and coordination between police 
and demonstrators by requiring attempts to establish pre-event contact and 
relationship building. Pre-event contact allows police and protest leaders to 
express their objectives and outline agreed upon acceptable behavior prior to the 
event.  
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7. Does the policy require an 
attempt to gather information on 
the event before it begins? 
D2 
 
Negotiated management strategies promote gathering intelligence to plan for 
demonstrations. By gathering intelligence, police learn more about potential risk 
factors to increase the effectiveness of crowd management strategies.  
8. Does the policy require police 
to determine if necessary permits 
have been issued prior to the 
event? 
D2i 
 
A large component of negotiated management strategies is the use of permits to 
outline acceptable crowd behavior. By reviewing whether there is a need for 
permit applications and whether applications have been submitted, police can 
promote lawful compliance by event organizers.   
9. Does the policy stipulate that 
police should determine whether 
additional personnel should be 
available when planning for the 
event? 
D2l 
 
Negotiated management strategies emphasize planning contingencies. Outlining 
whether additional personnel are necessary ensures that police are prepared for 
potential contingencies.  
10. Does the policy require 
officers to maintain a neutral 
demeanor during the event? 
D7 
 
Negotiated management strategies stipulate that police should work with 
protesters to promote peaceful demonstrations. Impartial police behavior can 
facilitate higher levels of positive interaction between police and potentially 
adversarial groups.  
11. Does the policy require 
continued police contact with 
protest organizers to gather 
intelligence throughout the 
demonstration? 
D9 
 
A central component of negotiated management strategies is police use of dialog 
during protests. Maintaining communication with protest organizers is essential to 
understand shifting dynamics of the event.  
12. Does the policy include 
directives for officers responding 
to a spontaneous civil 
disturbance? 
E As negotiated management strategies stress the importance of a planning 
approach, police should have contingencies for numerous outcomes. This includes 
a response plan for unplanned events that turn violent. By providing contingencies 
for unplanned occurrences, police can diminish the possibility of violence or other 
negative outcomes.  
13. Does the policy stipulate that 
traffic should be rerouted during 
spontaneous civil disturbances? 
E3a 
 
Negotiated management strategies emphasize police planning prior to events. This 
includes outlining contingencies to address foreseeable risks (e.g., traffic 
accidents) likely to occur during a spontaneous event.  
14. Does the policy require the 
use of dialog between police and 
crowd members as a solution to 
problems arising during the event 
F1 
 
Negotiated management strategies acknowledge that police dialog with protesters 
helps to deter violence and advocates the use of dialog as a first response to issues 
arising throughout the event.  
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prior to the use of other tactics 
(e.g., dispersal)? 
15. Does the policy require the 
police to issue verbal warnings to 
disperse before engaging in 
forced crowd dispersal tactics? 
F3 
 
Negotiated management strategies state that physical crowd dispersal tactics 
should be a last resort, when dialog is not possible or not effective. As such, by 
utilizing verbal commands first, police can reduce the potential for police use of 
force. 
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Command and Control Coding Items 
 
Protest Instrument Item IACP 
Reference 
Rationale for Inclusion 
1. Does the policy restrict time of 
protest to prevent community 
disruption? 
A1 
 
Command and control strategies involve restricting the time, place, and manner 
of protest to ensure minimal community disruption. Through this perspective, 
agencies placing restrictions on how, when, and where protesters can 
demonstrate align with command and control strategies. 
2. Does the policy restrict place 
of protest to prevent community 
disruption? 
A1 
 
Command and control strategies involve restricting the time, place, and manner 
of protest to ensure minimal community disruption. Through this perspective, 
agencies placing restrictions on how, when, and where protesters can 
demonstrate align with command and control strategies. 
3. Does the policy restrict manner 
of protest to prevent community 
disruption? 
A1 Command and control strategies involve restricting the time, place, and manner 
of protest to ensure minimal community disruption. Through this perspective, 
agencies placing restrictions on how, when, and where protesters can 
demonstrate align with command and control strategies. 
4. Does the policy prohibit canine 
units from being used for crowd 
control (i.e., spatial containment 
or dispersal)? 
B3a 
 
The IACP model policy prohibits canine units being used for crowd control 
purposes. Spatial containment is a defining tenet of command and control so 
ensuring that canine units cannot be used for spatial containment opposes the 
idea of command and control. This item will be reverse coded. 
5. Does the policy permit motor 
vehicles to be used for spatial 
containment? 
B3c 
 
As mentioned previously, spatial containment is a central component of 
command and control strategies. Utilizing motor vehicles as barricades would 
align with these same strategies.  
6. Does the policy require an 
avenue of escape for crowds after 
chemical agents are deployed? 
B3g 
 
Kettling is a controversial tactic used by police responsible for crowd control. 
This involves corralling crowds into a contained area. Utilizing chemical agents 
without an avenue of escape would align with command and control strategies. 
This item will be reverse coded. 
7. Does the policy allow batons to 
be used for spatial containment? 
B3h 
 
Spatial containment is a central component of command and control strategies. 
Utilizing batons to assist in spatial containment aligns with command and control 
strategies.  
8. Does the policy restrict 
bystanders from entering 
disturbance areas (e.g., only 
D8 
 
Spatial containment is used to minimize community disruption. According to 
command and control strategies, protest crowds are acceptable as long as they do 
not disrupt legitimate community activity. Restricting bystanders from entering 
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permitting those who reside, are 
employed, or have emergency 
business in the area)? 
 
the area aligns with this strategy because it diminishes the opportunity to expand 
the crowd size.   
9. Does the policy require that a 
perimeter be established during a 
civil disturbance? 
E2b 
 
Spatial containment can be used to prevent community disruption in the event of a 
civil disturbance. Establishing perimeters to contain disorderly or violent crowds 
aligns with command and control strategies. 
10. Does the policy allow for the 
use of barricades or police lines 
to contain crowd members in 
order to prevent community 
disruption?  
F1 
 
Utilizing barricades and police lines to contain crowds aligns with command and 
control strategies. This strategy promotes restricting the time, manner, and 
location of protest, which is often accomplished through the use of barricades.  
11. Does the policy permit police 
to engage in shows of force to 
control crowd behavior? 
F3b1 
 
Shows of force are often employed through tactics like police lines and 
formation, which “shock and awe” the crowd into compliance. The “shock and 
awe” component of crowd control, rather than crowd management tactics align 
with command and control strategies.    
12. Does the policy allow police 
lines to be formed to disperse 
unruly crowds that fail to vacate 
the location following verbal 
directives? 
F3b1 
 
Police lines are often used to shock and awe crowds into dispersing. The use of 
these tactics aligns with command and control.  
13. Does the policy allow the use 
of mobile field forces, or other 
specialized units (e.g., mounted, 
motorcycle), to disperse unruly 
crowds that fail to disperse 
following verbal directives? 
F3b1 
 
Command and control strategies often promote the use of specialized units to 
disperse crowds. These units, like mobile field forces, specialize in civil 
disturbances responses that include crowd dispersal to prevent further violence.  
14. Does the policy permit crowd 
encirclement tactics to disperse 
unruly crowds that fail to disperse 
following verbal directives? 
F3b2 
 
Kettling is a controversial tactic used by police responsible for crowd control. 
This is a form of corralling crowds into an area. Utilizing these containment 
tactics aligns with command and control tactics.   
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15. Does the policy require police 
to establish a secure detention 
area for prisoners awaiting 
transportation following a mass 
arrest? 
G2 
 
While mass arrest is a tactic employed under escalated force strategies, utilizing 
secure areas aligns with command and control tactics. Secure detention areas 
restrict access to and protect detainees.  
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Escalated Force Coding Items 
 
Protest Instrument Item IACP 
Reference 
Rationale for Inclusion 
1. Does the policy stipulate that 
disorderly or threatening crowds 
be dispersed to eliminate 
immediate risk or violence 
escalation? 
A4b 
 
Escalated force strategies embrace dispersal tactics as a legitimate crowd 
management strategy. Therefore, this item will measure whether advisement for 
dispersal tactics are included in the policy.  
2. Does the policy stipulate that 
demonstrators engaging in 
unlawful behavior will be 
arrested? 
A4c, F1c 
 
While negotiated management strategies employ arrest symbolically or as a last 
resort, escalated force strategies employ arrest as an initial response to unlawful 
behavior. Agencies adopting this approach typically employ legalistic approaches 
to unlawful behavior.  
3. Does the policy allow for mass 
arrests during civil disturbances? 
A6, F2, 
F3b3, G 
 
Escalated force strategies typically employ mass arrest during civil disturbances. 
Mass arrest tactics are employed to disperse crowds in an attempt to prevent 
further violence.  
4. Does the policy prohibit firing 
impact projectiles into the crowd 
indiscriminately? 
B3d 
 
Escalated force strategies promote indiscriminate use of force. As such, rather 
than focusing only on problematic individuals, agencies adopting the escalated 
force approach disperse crowds through the use of indiscriminate force. This item 
will be reverse coded. 
5. Does the agency prohibit the 
firing of non-direct skip fire 
rounds indiscriminately into 
crowds unless life is in immediate 
danger? 
B3d1 
 
Escalated force strategies promote indiscriminate use of force.  As such, rather 
than focusing only on problematic individuals, agencies adopting the escalated 
force approach disperse crowds through the use of indiscriminate force. This item 
will be reverse coded. 
6. Does the policy advise that 
direct fire rounds should be used 
only against those who pose a 
threat of death to others or 
significant property damage? 
 
B3d2 
 
Escalated force strategies promote indiscriminate use of force. The IACP policy 
advocates targeting only individuals engaged in harmful behavior, rather than the 
entire crowd. As such, this policy item directly opposes the indiscriminate 
application of force promoted by escalated force strategies. This item will be 
reverse coded. 
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7. Does the policy prohibit the 
use of Electronic Control 
Weapons (ECW’s) for the 
purpose of restraint or arrest 
when less forceful measures of 
control are available?  
B3e 
 
Escalated force strategies emphasize the use of force to uphold the law and 
disperse crowds. This is typically accomplished through use of force and arrest, 
rather than less forceful or intrusive measures. This item will be reverse coded. 
8. Does the policy prohibit the 
firing of Electronic Control 
Weapons (ECW’s) into the crowd 
indiscriminately? 
B3e 
 
Escalated force strategies promote indiscriminate use of force. As such, the 
escalated force approach does not require differential treatment of individual 
crowd members. This item will be reverse coded. 
9. Does the policy prohibit 
aerosol restraint sprays from 
being fired into the crowd where 
bystanders would be 
unreasonably affected?  
B3f 
 
Escalated force strategies employ force in a manner that will disperse the crowd 
by any means necessary. The use of indiscriminate force is a central component 
of these strategies. Therefore, escalated force would employ these tactics without 
accounting for bystanders. This item will be reverse coded. 
10. Does the policy restrict the 
application of aerosol restraint 
sprays to only individuals 
engaging in unlawful behavior, 
resisting arrest, or those who pose 
a threat to officer safety (i.e., in 
self-defense)? 
B3f 
 
Escalated force strategies employ force in a manner that will disperse the crowd 
by any means necessary. The use of indiscriminate force is a central component 
of these strategies. Escalated force would argue that crowds should be targeted as 
a whole, rather than focusing solely on problematic individuals. As such, this 
item opposes the central tenets of escalated force strategies and will be reverse 
coded. 
11. Does the policy restrict the 
use of CS chemical agents to 
instances when lesser force 
options are unavailable or would 
be ineffective? 
B3g 
 
Escalated force strategies prioritize arrest and use of force as being the most 
appropriate responses to aggression. Utilizing chemical agents when lesser force 
options would still be effective to disperse the crowd would align with escalated 
force strategies. Therefore, this item opposes the central tenets of the escalated 
force model and will be reverse coded. 
12. Does the policy allow batons 
to be used for crowd dispersal? 
B3h 
 
Escalated force strategies promote police use of force as a means of crowd 
dispersal. As such, utilizing weapons for this purpose would align with escalated 
force strategies.  
13. Does the policy require 
officers to maintain a courteous 
demeanor during the event?  
D7 Courteous behavior promotes positive interaction between police and 
participants. However, this type of behavior is antithetical to escalated force 
strategies. This item will be reverse coded.   
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14. Does the policy restrict crowd 
control tactics (e.g., use of force, 
containment, dispersal, or mass 
arrests) to civil disturbances? 
III. 
Definitions 
 
The indiscriminate application of crowd control tactics including show of force, 
use of force, and the use of less-lethal weapons to gain crowd compliance aligns 
with escalated force strategies. This item assesses whether policies restrict crowd 
control tactics to civil disturbances, and is therefore antithetical to escalated force 
strategies. As such, this item will be reverse coded. 
15. Does the policy allow police 
to carry resistant demonstrators 
when they refuse to walk?  
G4 
 
Escalated force strategies promote the use of force when there is non-compliance 
among individuals within the crowd. By allowing police to physically remove 
noncompliant protesters, agencies promote officer behavior aligned with 
escalated force strategies.  
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APPENDIX C 
 
Sample Agencies, By Strata 
 
Population Size Region of the United 
States 
Agency Name City State 
500,000+ N/A Tucson Police 
Department 
Tucson AZ 
  Fresno Police 
Department 
Fresno CA 
  San Francisco Police 
Department 
San Francisco CA 
  San Jose Police 
Department 
San Jose CA 
  San Diego Police 
Department 
San Diego CA 
  Los Angeles Police 
Department 
Los Angeles  CA 
  Denver Police 
Department 
Denver CO 
  Washington Metro 
Police Department 
-- DC 
  Miami-Dade County 
Police Department 
Miami FL 
  Cobb County Police 
Department  
Marietta  GA 
  Dekalb County Police 
Department 
Tucker GA 
  Gwinnett County Police 
Department 
Lawrenceville GA 
  Chicago Police 
Department 
Chicago IL 
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  Indianapolis Metro 
Police 
Indianapolis IN 
  Louisville Metro Police 
Department 
Louisville KY 
  Baltimore Police 
Department 
Baltimore MD 
  Prince George’s County 
Police Department 
Palmer Park MD 
  Baltimore County 
Police Department 
Towson MD 
  Montgomery County 
Police Department 
Rockville MD 
  Detroit Police 
Department 
Detroit MI 
  Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Police Department 
Charlotte NC 
  Albuquerque Police 
Department 
Albuquerque NM 
  Las Vegas Metropolitan 
Police Department 
Las Vegas NV 
  Nassau County Police 
Department 
Mineola NY 
  Suffolk County Police 
Department 
Yaphank NY 
  New York City Police 
Department 
New York NY 
  Columbus Police 
Department 
Columbus OH 
  Oklahoma City Police 
Department 
Oklahoma City OK 
  Portland Police  
Bureau 
Portland OR 
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  Philadelphia Police 
Department 
Philadelphia PA 
  Nashville Metro Police 
Department 
Nashville TN 
  El Paso Police 
Department 
El Paso TX 
  Fort Worth Police 
Department  
Fort Worth TX 
  Austin Police 
Department 
Austin TX 
  Dallas Police 
Department 
Dallas TX 
  San Antonio Police 
Department 
San Antonio TX 
  Fairfax County Police 
Department 
Fairfax VA 
  Seattle Police 
Department 
Seattle WA 
  Milwaukee Police 
Department 
Milwaukee WI 
200,000 – 499,999 West North Las Vegas Police 
Department 
North Las Vegas NV 
  Riverside Police 
Department 
Riverside CA 
  Oakland Police 
Department 
Oakland CA 
  Long Beach Police 
Department 
Long Beach CA 
  Boise Police 
Department 
Boise ID 
 Midwest Minneapolis Police 
Department 
Minneapolis MN 
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  Wichita Police 
Department 
Wichita KS 
  St. Louis County Police 
Department 
St. Louis MO 
  Omaha Police 
Department 
Omaha NE 
  Cincinnati Police 
Department 
Cincinnati OH 
 South Lexington Police 
Department 
Lexington KY 
  Orlando Police 
Department 
Orlando FL 
  Fayetteville Police 
Department 
Fayetteville NC 
  Durham Police 
Department 
Durham NC 
  Raleigh Police 
Department 
Raleigh NC 
 Northeast Rochester Police 
Department 
Rochester NY 
  Newark Police 
Department 
Newark NJ 
  Pittsburgh Bureau of 
Police 
Pittsburgh PA 
100,000-199,999 West El Cajon Police 
Department 
El Cajon CA 
  Fullerton Police 
Department 
Fullerton CA 
  Boulder Police 
Department 
Boulder CO 
  Peoria Police 
Department 
Peoria AZ 
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  Lakewood Police 
Department 
Lakewood CO 
 Midwest Elgin Police  
Department 
Elgin IL 
  Aurora Police 
Department 
Aurora IL 
  Grand Rapids Police 
Department 
Grand Rapids MI 
  Springfield Police 
Department 
Springfield MO 
  Columbia Police 
Department 
Columbia MO 
 South Alexandria Police 
Department 
Alexandria VA 
  Henry County Police 
Department 
McDonough GA 
  Knoxville Police 
Department 
Knoxville TN 
  Charleston Police 
Department 
Charleston SC 
  Columbia Police 
Department 
Columbia SC 
 Northeast New Haven Police 
Department 
New Haven CT 
  Cambridge Police 
Department 
Cambridge MA 
  Woodbridge Township 
Police Department 
Woodbridge NJ 
  Amherst Police 
Department 
Amherst NY 
  Providence Police 
Department 
Providence RI 
  
 
131 
50,000-99,999 West Kirkland Police 
Department 
Kirkland WA 
  Davis Police 
Department 
Davis CA 
  Newport Beach Police 
Department 
Newport Beach CA 
  Loveland Police 
Department 
Loveland CO 
  Rio Rancho Department 
of Public Safety 
Rio Rancho NM 
 Midwest Iowa City Police 
Department 
Iowa City IA 
  Waterloo Police 
Department 
Waterloo IA 
  Evanston Police 
Department 
Evanston IL 
  Duluth Police 
Department 
Duluth MN 
  Bellevue Police 
Department 
Bellevue NE 
 South Lakeland Police 
Department 
Lakeland FL 
  Bowie Police 
Department 
Bowie MD 
  Chapel Hill Police 
Department 
Chapel Hill NC 
  Asheville Police 
Department 
Asheville NC 
  Fayetteville Police 
Department 
Fayeteville AR 
 Northeast Framingham Police 
Department  
Framingham MA 
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  Brookline Police 
Department 
Brookline MA 
  Somerville Police 
Department 
Somerville MA 
  Albany Police 
Department 
Albany NY 
  Lower Merion 
Township Police 
Department 
Ardmore PA 
25,000-49,999 West Tigard Police 
Department 
Tigard OR 
  Oro Valley Police 
Department 
Oro Valley AZ 
  Bell Police 
 Department 
Bell CA 
  Beverly Hills Police 
Department 
Beverly Hills CA 
  Culver City Police 
Department 
Culver City CA 
 Midwest Burbank Police 
Department 
Burbank IL 
  Urbana Police 
Department 
Urbana IL 
  Roseville Police 
Department 
Roseville MN 
  Gladstone Police 
Department 
Gladstone MO 
  Greenfield Police 
Department 
Greenfield WI 
 South Gainesville Police 
Department 
Gainesville GA 
  Myrtle Beach Police 
Department 
Myrtle Beach SC 
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  Greenville Police 
Department 
Greenville TX 
  Texarkana Police 
Department 
Texarkana TX 
  Lancaster Police 
Department 
Lancaster TX 
 Northeast Watertown Police 
Department 
Watertown MA 
  Amherst Police 
Department 
Amherst MA 
  Concord Police 
Department 
Concord NH 
  Yorktown Police 
Department 
Yorktown Heights NY 
  Chester Police 
Department 
Chester PA 
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